S v S

In a long marriage, equality remains the usual starting point where both parties have made full contributions, including through earning, homemaking and childcare. Property received from a family member may be relevant, but its origin does not automatically justify ring-fencing it, particularly where both parties’ needs require the assets. A speculative future inheritance is ordinarily a background factor carrying little weight where its timing and amount are uncertain. An appellate court may intervene where the first-instance judge fails to analyse the financial effect of the order and thereby reaches a plainly wrong result. A judge must provide sufficient analysis of the figures to explain the outcome.

The husband appealed against ancillary relief orders made by District Judge Jacks in the Stafford County Court. The order transferred the husband’s interest in the Aberdeen property to the wife, awarded her a lump sum, divided the pensions equally, and ring-fenced two assets derived from the wife’s family. The district judge also made orders concerning trusts and accounts held for the parties’ adult children.

The husband challenged the unequal effect of ring-fencing the wife’s assets, the treatment of her prospective inheritance, the failure to analyse the parties’ needs and resources, and the orders concerning the children’s funds. The central issues were whether the district judge’s assessment was plainly wrong and whether the order achieved a fair division under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

1. Appeal allowed in substance. The district judge’s order was varied so that the parties’ assets, including pensions and the assets derived from the wife’s family, were divided equally. The parties’ arrangements concerning the children’s funds were also recorded, and the wife was awarded compensation through periodical payments for the delay in receiving the lump sum.
2. Applying Cordle v Cordle [2002] 1 FLR 207, an appeal lies where there has been procedural irregularity, relevant matters have been ignored, irrelevant matters considered, or the result is plainly wrong. The district judge was entitled to find that the wife’s future inheritance could not be valued reliably and was not property which she was likely to have in the foreseeable future.
3. The possible inheritance was therefore only a background factor carrying little weight. The court could not assume that the wife’s parents would preserve their assets or leave them to her. Under the principles in Miller v McFarlane, the husband had no present entitlement to compensation for an uncertain inheritance expected after the marriage had ended.
4. The district judge was plainly wrong to ring-fence the wife’s family-derived assets. This was a needs case. Both parties required homes and long-term financial provision, and both had made full and proper contributions. The wife’s homemaking and childcare contribution was not inferior to the husband’s financial contribution. The husband’s pre-marital assets and pension accrual were also relevant circumstances.
5. The failure to analyse the figures meant that the appellate court could not understand the basis of the result. A district judge has a duty to clarify the financial consequences of the order, and the absence of analysis was not cured by the possibility that counsel might have asked for clarification. The court could reconsider an order while executory, as recognised in Thwaite v Thwaite, but that did not excuse the original failure.
6. The court also held that an ineffective FDR should ordinarily be followed by another appointment as soon as practicable. The court should be slow to interfere with accounts held for adult children, and the procedural rules concerning necessary parties must be followed.

• Stafford County Court: District Judge Jacks made ancillary relief orders on 9 August 2006, including a lump sum, pension sharing, ring-fencing of two assets derived from the wife’s family, and orders concerning children’s funds.
• High Court (Family Division): The husband’s appeal was allowed in substance. The assets were to be divided equally, subject to the consequential arrangements and compensation for delay specified in the judgment.