Persimmon Homes Ltd, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Covernment & Ors

A Secretary of State deciding whether to call in a planning application may make a preliminary assessment of its apparent planning merits where necessary to identify conflicts with important national policies or issues of more than local importance. The decision is not a determination of the application on its merits.

Where no statutory duty to give reasons exists, a call-in decision letter need not address every relevant consideration. The court may generally accept an assertion that all relevant material was considered unless the reasons disclose legal error. Prematurity requires consideration of the proposal’s scale, location and phasing, the stage reached in the development-plan process, housing need and the delay caused by waiting. The existence of other possible sites does not necessarily create a material comparison, particularly where there is no rival application for the same project.

Persimmon Homes Ltd sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision not to call in a planning application for a substantial mixed-use development at Bankside, near Banbury. Cherwell District Council had resolved to grant permission, subject to a section 106 agreement, and referred the application as a departure from the development plan.

The claimant argued that the Secretary of State had failed to consider national policy on community involvement, prematurity and alternative sites, had considered the application’s planning merits impermissibly, and had acted irrationally. The central issue was whether the call-in decision disclosed an error of law or fell outside the Secretary of State’s broad discretion under section 77 of the 1990 Act.

1. Call-in discretion and planning merits. The application was dismissed. The Secretary of State’s task was to decide who should determine the application, not whether permission should be granted. Nevertheless, a preliminary assessment of apparent planning merits was permissible insofar as it enabled assessment of conflict with important national policies or issues of more than local importance. The decision letter expressly maintained that distinction and did not undertake a balancing exercise to determine the application.
2. Reasons and relevant considerations. The Secretary of State was not required to give reasons for declining to call in an application. Where reasons were given, they could be examined for legal error, but the identification of the main matters did not establish that other matters had been ignored. The court accepted that the Secretary of State had considered the report and the representations, including community involvement, prematurity and alternative sites.
3. Prematurity. The prematurity analysis required consideration of whether the proposal was so substantial that it would predetermine decisions on the scale, location or phasing of development, together with the stage reached in the development-plan process and the delay caused by awaiting that process. Housing need was a material consideration. It was lawful to conclude that refusal on prematurity grounds was not justified where waiting would significantly delay housing delivery.
4. Community involvement and alternative sites. National policy on community involvement did not confer a right on objectors to an independent inspector’s hearing. The alternative-site issue did not involve rival applications for the same project. The criteria discussed in Greater London Council v Secretary of State for the Environment and London Docklands Development Corporation [1986] JPL 193 and Secretary of State for the Environment v Edwards [1994] 1 PLR 62 therefore did not require a comparison which could affect the call-in decision.
5. Disposition. The claimant’s grounds were rejected. The application was dismissed, and the claimant was ordered to pay the defendant’s costs, summarily assessed at £23,403.64.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. No appeal history is stated in the judgment.