C C v R C

In ancillary relief proceedings after a long marriage, the court must apply the statutory discretion flexibly and pursue fairness. The guidance on sharing, matrimonial property and non-matrimonial property does not create rigid formulas or require precise boundaries in every case. A pre-marital relationship may be taken into account without identifying a precise start date. Substantial pre-marital wealth may justify departure from equality, but its effect is assessed broadly and is not confined to heirlooms or assets retained in specie. Historical financial investigations should be proportionate; a broad assessment may be preferable to artificial certainty. Where sharing subsumes needs, the court may divide the parties’ wealth unequally to reflect substantial pre-marital resources.

The wife applied for ancillary relief following the parties’ marriage in 1988 and separation in 2005. Their present wealth was approximately £22.2 million. The wife sought an equal division, arguing that most wealth had been generated during the relationship or marriage. The husband relied on substantial pre-marital wealth and sought an award limited to the wife’s generously assessed needs.

The central issues were the significance of the parties’ pre-marital relationship, the extent and effect of the husband’s pre-marital wealth, the application of the sharing principle, and the relevance of article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights.

1. Outcome. The wife was awarded 40 per cent of the current wealth, with the pension assets and other assets divided in the same proportion. Both applications for permission to appeal were refused.
2. The court was required to apply the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and its section 25 factors. The guidance in Miller and McFarlane and Charman v Charman was guidance, not a series of statutory tests. The court should avoid rigid stepping stones, precise classifications and formulaic calculations where they might produce injustice (paras [47]-[48], [92]-[94]).
3. The parties’ relationship since 1984 was a relevant circumstance, although there was no clearly defined pre-marital start date. The court was entitled to make a broad assessment rather than conduct an intrusive historical reconstruction of the relationship (paras [62]-[74]).
4. The husband had substantial resources before the marriage and before 1984. That fact justified departure from equality. The relevant assessment was broader than a case involving heirlooms or assets retained in specie. No formula could determine the proper extent of the departure (paras [77]-[87], [93]-[95]).
5. The sharing principle applied to the parties’ property, while the non-matrimonial character and source of property could provide a reason for departing from equality. In this case, sharing subsumed the parties’ needs, and a 40 per cent award was fair (paras [88]-[95]).
6. The reliance on article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights raised no separate issue. Even if applicable, the statutory power was lawful, in the public interest and proportionate (paras [96]-[97]).

This was a first-instance ancillary relief decision. After judgment, both parties applied for permission to appeal on the extent of the departure from equality and the human-rights issue. The applications were refused (para [98]).