Crown Prosecution Service, R (on the application of) v Uxbridge Magistrates

A magistrates’ court has a judicial discretion to adjourn a criminal trial. Interference is justified only where the decision was plainly wrong, having regard to expedition, the defendant’s interests, the public interest in trial, likely delay, prejudice, the history of the case and all the circumstances.

A refusal to admit a witness statement under Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 116, is a separate decision from refusal of an adjournment. The court must address the statutory conditions and the interests of justice. Where an erroneous refusal directly causes an acquittal, the acquittal may be quashed and the case returned for reconsideration.

The Crown sought judicial review of decisions made by Uxbridge Magistrates’ Court during the trial of a charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The magistrates refused an adjournment after the complainant was compulsorily admitted to hospital, then refused to admit her police statement under Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 116, without waiting for medical confirmation of her unfitness to attend. The prosecution offered no evidence and the defendant was acquitted.

The central issues were whether the refusals were plainly wrong and whether the resulting acquittal could be quashed.

1. Adjournment. The power under Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 10(1), is discretionary. The court must scrutinise prosecution applications rigorously, while applying the overriding objective of the Criminal Procedure Rules. Relevant matters include expedition, the defendant’s interests, the public interest in trial, the seriousness of the charge, likely delay and its consequences, the history of the case, prejudice and all the circumstances.
2. The magistrates were entitled to refuse the adjournment. At that stage it was not inevitable that the prosecution would collapse, and enquiries continued into whether the complainant could attend.
3. Hearsay application. The application under Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 116, was separate from the adjournment application. The magistrates wrongly treated it as an attempt to reopen their earlier decision and failed to consider s 116(4) and the interests of justice. The defendant could challenge the statement by giving evidence, so its admission would have been an imperfect but fair means of proceeding.
4. The refusal was plainly wrong. Since it directly caused the prosecution to offer no evidence and the merits were never considered, the court quashed the hearsay ruling and the acquittal, returning the case to the magistrates for reconsideration.

Uxbridge Magistrates’ Court: refused an adjournment and refused the prosecution’s application to admit the complainant’s statement under Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 116. The prosecution then offered no evidence and the defendant was acquitted.

High Court (Administrative Court): quashed the hearsay ruling and the acquittal, and returned the case to the magistrates for reconsideration.