General Medical Council, R (on the application of) v Stevenson

When deciding the duration of an interim professional suspension, the court must balance public protection against the impact of continued suspension on the practitioner. The period must be proportionate to the realistic time required for investigations and any substantive hearing. The court may select a period shorter than that sought, particularly where the regulator has provided limited information about the progress of its investigation. The practitioner may seek discharge if the matter is progressing too slowly.

The General Medical Council applied under section 41A(6) and (7) of the Medical Act 1983 to extend an interim order suspending Dr Michael Stevenson. The order had followed his suspension from a performers list, his conviction for manslaughter arising from the administration of excessive diamorphine, and further investigations concerning the deaths of other patients.

The GMC sought a further 12 months to investigate 14 cases, obtain decisions from its case examiners and, if necessary, prepare for a substantive fitness to practise hearing. Dr Stevenson accepted that his medical career was over but sought a six-month extension because of the effect of prolonged proceedings on his psychiatric health. The issue was the appropriate duration of the extension.

1. Application granted in part. The interim order of suspension was extended for nine months, until 6 June 2008. There was no order as to costs.
2. Under section 41A(6) and (7) of the Medical Act 1983, the court had to determine a period that adequately protected the public while remaining proportionate to the circumstances and the anticipated progress of the regulatory process.
3. The evidence concerning the convicted offence, the further patient cases and the expert report made it reasonably likely that many or all of the further allegations would be referred for a substantive hearing. A period extending beyond the investigation and case-examination stages could therefore be justified in principle.
4. However, the GMC had supplied very little information about what investigative steps had been taken since receiving the further reports. That omission gave substance to the concern that the proceedings might be delayed. The court therefore rejected both the requested 12-month period and the defendant’s proposed six-month period.
5. The resulting balance was a nine-month extension. The defendant’s solicitors could apply for discharge if there were grounds to believe that the matter was progressing too slowly.

Not stated in the judgment.