Secretary of State for the Home Department, R (on the application of) v Mental Health Review Tribunal & Ors

A tribunal deciding whether to direct conditional discharge must be satisfied that the statutory criteria for discharge are met. It cannot use conditions as preconditions which defer discharge until trial leave or approval from another body has occurred. Conditions requiring agreement from the Secretary of State or MAPPA are unlawful. Where the tribunal’s reasoning and the evidence show that it considered transfer to lower-security hospital accommodation, rather than discharge, to be appropriate, a purported conditional discharge is irrational. The court may quash the whole decision where the unlawful conditions are integral to the tribunal’s reasoning. The court did not decide whether restrictions on leaving proposed accommodation amounted to a deprivation of liberty.

The Secretary of State applied for judicial review of a Mental Health Review Tribunal decision directing the deferred conditional discharge of JC. The proposed conditions required residence at a specified establishment, escorted leave, satisfactory trial leave, and agreement from the Secretary of State, MAPPA and the proposed responsible medical officer.

The Tribunal accepted by consent that its decision was unlawful because the statutory criteria had not been met and because at least one condition amounted to continued detention. JC argued that the decision could survive if the unlawful conditions were removed. The central issues were whether the Tribunal had rationally concluded that conditional discharge was justified and whether the disputed conditions could lawfully be imposed.

1. The claim succeeded. Permission was granted, the Tribunal’s decision was quashed, and the matter was remitted to the Mental Health Review Tribunal for a fresh hearing. The Tribunal was given discretion to determine whether the hearing should be before the original or a fresh panel. There was no order as to costs, subject to detailed assessment of publicly funded costs.
2. Under section 72(1)(b) of the Mental Health Act 1973, the Tribunal had to be satisfied that JC was not suffering from a relevant disorder of a nature or degree making hospital detention appropriate, and that hospital treatment was not necessary for his health or safety or the protection of others. The evidence did not rationally support that conclusion. The medical evidence continued to identify a relevant disorder and a significant risk to the public.
3. The Tribunal’s earlier reasoning, which it adopted by reference, indicated that JC required transfer to a lower-security hospital as a step towards possible eventual discharge. The evidence of Dr Turner and the Longcroft assessment supported supervised low-security accommodation and further testing, not immediate discharge. The Tribunal’s December decision therefore conflicted with its own reasoning and the evidence before it.
4. The requirements for satisfactory trial leave and agreement by the Secretary of State and MAPPA were not lawful conditions of discharge. They were preconditions to discharge. A Tribunal cannot defer discharge until another body agrees to it. Those conditions strongly indicated that the Tribunal had not been satisfied that the statutory discharge criteria were met.
5. The court declined to decide whether the combined requirements of residence at Longcroft and escorted departure amounted to a deprivation of liberty. That issue was unnecessary to determine because the statutory and irrationality challenges succeeded.

The judgment was a first-instance judicial review of a Mental Health Review Tribunal decision dated 4 December 2006. The Tribunal had directed deferred conditional discharge and subsequently accepted by consent that its decision was unlawful. The Administrative Court quashed the decision and remitted the matter for a fresh hearing.