Kostic v Chaplin & Ors

Testamentary capacity requires the testator to understand the act and effect of making a will, the extent of the property, and the claims meriting consideration. It also requires that no disorder of the mind or insane delusion has poisoned the testator’s affections, perverted the sense of right or influenced the disposition. These are separate requirements. Where delusions are established, the will must be regarded with great distrust, particularly where it excludes close family members. A will is invalid if the delusions in fact influenced the disposition and produced a result which the testator would not have made if of sound mind. The court left unresolved whether invalidity could arise where delusions were merely likely, but did not in fact, influence the disposition.

The claimant challenged the validity of the deceased’s 1988 and 1989 wills and a 1984 codicil. The deceased had suffered from a serious untreated delusional disorder from the mid-1980s. The 1988 and 1989 wills left his estate to the Conservative Party Association, while the earlier testamentary dispositions primarily benefited his only son. The central issue was whether the deceased had testamentary capacity, particularly whether his delusions affected his appreciation of his son’s claims and influenced the dispositions. The validity of the 1984 codicil was also considered, although its validity did not affect the ultimate beneficiary once the later wills were invalidated.

1. The action succeeded. The court pronounced against the 1989 Will, the 1988 Will and the 1984 Codicil. Probate was to be granted of the 1974 Will.

2. Following Banks v Goodfellow (1870) 5QB 549, and the exposition in Sharp v Adam [2006] EWCA Civ 449, testamentary capacity has four separate elements: understanding the nature and effect of the act; understanding the extent of the property; comprehending and appreciating the claims to which effect ought to be given; and freedom from mental disorder or insane delusion which influences the disposition.

3. The court accepted that the deceased’s delusional disorder was established and persistent. The wills were therefore to be approached with great distrust. His delusions concerned his wife, mother and sister, and implicated his son, at least as a victim or person influenced by them.

4. The deceased’s decision to exclude his only son was materially influenced by those delusions. His natural affection had been poisoned and he could not properly comprehend and appreciate his son’s claims. The dispositions were ones he would not have made if of sound mind. The failure of the delusions to influence the disposition was therefore not proved.

5. The court also concluded, although it was unnecessary to the result, that the deceased’s choice of the Conservative Party Association and the proposed foundation was materially connected with his delusional beliefs. His longstanding political allegiance did not exclude that influence.

6. The court further concluded that the 1984 Codicil was invalid. Postponing the son’s vesting age was rationally explicable, but the unexplained substitution of a friend for the deceased’s sister as default beneficiary was probably influenced by the developing delusions.

7. The court expressly left unresolved whether a will could be invalid where delusions were likely to influence the disposition but had not in fact done so, since that question could not affect the outcome.