Brown, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government & Anor

On a challenge to a planning decision under section 288, the court must distinguish legal error from disagreement with planning judgment. An inspector’s reasons are sufficient if, read fairly and as a whole, they enable an informed reader to understand the conclusions reached on the principal controversial issues and reveal no substantial doubt about legal error. The inspector need not use the precise language of the relevant policy if the decision makes the substance of the assessment clear. Where a policy prohibits development causing material harm, a conclusion that development would markedly change the character of the area may adequately convey material harm. An inspector may also conclude that a very small increase in traffic would materially harm living conditions where existing roads are already at or near capacity.

The claimant applied under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to quash an inspector’s decision letter dated 15 June 2006. The inspector had dismissed two appeals concerning proposed static holiday caravan parks at Foxburrow Farm, Suffolk. The challenge concerned the appeal relating to a proposed change of use to a static holiday caravan park with ancillary recreation, access and storage facilities.

The claimant alleged that the inspector had misunderstood or misapplied Suffolk Coastal Local Plan policy AP112, particularly its requirement that development should not materially harm the landscape or living conditions of nearby residents. It was also argued that the inspector had failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting or failing to accept traffic evidence predicting only about one additional car per hour. The central issues were whether the decision disclosed legal error or inadequate reasoning.

1. Application dismissed. The inspector’s decision was within the statutory powers and was not irrational.
2. The court applied the principles summarised by Lord Brown in South Bucks DC v Porter (No 2), [2004] UKHL 33. Reasons must be intelligible and adequate, enabling an informed reader to understand why the decision was reached and how the principal important controversial issues were resolved. They need address the main issues, rather than every material consideration. A reasons challenge succeeds only where inadequate reasoning causes substantial prejudice and creates a substantial doubt that the decision-maker erred in law.
3. The inspector correctly understood policy AP112. Although the explanatory text stated that static caravans, cabins and chalets inevitably detracted from the landscape, that wording could not override the policy’s more precise provision allowing development in some parts of the AONB. The policy required an assessment of whether harm was material; it did not create an absolute prohibition.
4. Read as a whole, the inspector’s findings that the development would markedly change the character of an open and largely undeveloped area sufficiently conveyed that the landscape harm was material. The inspector therefore did not need to repeat the exact expression material harm.
5. The inspector was entitled to resolve the traffic evidence pragmatically. Even accepting the claimant’s estimate of approximately one additional car per hour, he could conclude that a minimal increase would have a disproportionate effect where village roads were already at or near capacity. That was a matter of planning judgment, not irrationality. The principle that planning judgment lies primarily with the planning decision-maker, recalled from Tesco, [1995] 1 WLR 759, applied.
6. The remaining grounds were not pursued expressly and were rejected. The application was formally dismissed, with the Secretary of State’s costs summarily assessed at £5,836.

This was a first-instance application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 challenging an inspector’s decision letter. The application was dismissed by the High Court (Administrative Court).