Case details
Summary
An allocation scheme under Part VI of the Housing Act 1996 must give reasonable preference to applicants in the statutory categories and enable the authority to assess cumulative housing need. It is unlawful to treat an applicant with several material needs in the same way as one with only a single, lesser need. The scheme need not prescribe every factor of medical or social need in advance, provided the decision-maker and assessment process are sufficiently identified and individual decisions are properly reasoned. Section 167(1A) does not require choice-based lettings for every applicant. A lawful scheme may use direct offers, but it must still reflect cumulative need and statutory priority.
Factual background
The claimant and his family occupied seriously overcrowded accommodation. His daughter had extensive disabilities and required her own bedroom; another child and the claimant also had asserted medical needs. The claimant challenged negative medical assessments and the defendant council’s Part VI allocation scheme.
The scheme used choice-based lettings for some applicants and direct offers for others. The challenge alleged inadequate reasons, failure to recognise cumulative or multiple need, insufficient guidance on medical and social assessments, and unlawful restriction of choice. The central issues were whether the individual assessments were lawful and whether the scheme complied with the statutory reasonable-preference and choice requirements.
Held
- Individual assessments. The medical assessments concerning the claimant and Amaan were quashed. They did not explain the criteria applied, how medical need related to reasonable preference, or how the evidence was evaluated. The council had undertaken to reconsider the applications and give reasons within 28 days, using best endeavours.
- Cumulative need. Part VI requires an allocation scheme to enable a judgment on cumulative housing need. The categories in section 167(2) are not watertight compartments. A scheme may give different weight to different categories, but it must distinguish applicants with multiple or greater needs from those with only a single and lesser need. This principle was supported by Reilly and Mannix, (1998) 31 HLR 651, Al-Khorsan, (2001) 33 HLR 6, and the Court of Appeal decision in R (A) v Lambeth London Borough Council, R (Lindsay) v Lambeth London Borough Council, [2002] EWCA Civ 1084, (2002) HLR 57. The reasoning in Cali, [2006] EWHC 302 Admin, [2007] HLR 1, was adopted.
- Effect of later legislation. Section 167(2A) permits specified factors to be taken into account, but does not displace the continuing requirement for cumulative assessment under section 167(2). The decision in R (on the application of Lin) v London Borough of Barnet, [2007] EWCA Civ 132, [2007] HLR 30, concerned non-priority points and did not undermine that conclusion.
- Other grounds. The policy was not unlawful merely because it did not provide choice-based lettings to every applicant. Section 167(1A) required a statement of policy on choice or opportunities to express preferences, not a universal choice-based scheme. Nor did the statute require every medical or social factor to be exhaustively prescribed in advance, although the assessment process and reasons had to be adequate.
- Relief. The application for judicial review was allowed to the stated extent. The individual decisions were quashed. The cases were to be reconsidered according to law and according to a lawful multiple-needs policy. The whole policy was not quashed. The claimant recovered costs. Permission to appeal was granted to both sides on the issues on which they had not succeeded, but no stay was granted.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.
Appellate history
This was a first-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. The judgment records that permission to appeal was granted to both parties on issues on which they had not succeeded. No stay was granted.
Key cases cited
This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.
Cases citing this case
This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.