Security Industry Authority v Stewart & Sansara & Ors

Under the Private Security Industry Act 2001, the licensing authority and statutory appeal courts must apply the published licensing criteria. Where those criteria create an automatic disqualification based on specified convictions and time periods, they provide no general discretion to examine the individual merits or circumstances of the offence.

Hard-edged criteria of that kind are lawful where authorised by the Act. Their practical operation, including automatic refusal, was not displaced by the applicants’ Convention arguments. The scheme pursued the legitimate public interest of excluding criminality from door supervision and was proportionate.

Five conjoined matters concerned refusals by the Security Industry Authority to grant door-supervisor licences. The applicants had convictions falling within categories in the Authority’s published criteria, which required applicants to be free from the effects of specified convictions for either two or five years.

In Stewart and Sansara, Crown Courts held that appellate courts could consider the individual merits of the convictions. In Rahim, Bakr and Egenti, the issue arose through appeals or judicial review of refusals. The central question was whether the Act required strict application of the criteria or permitted a discretionary merits assessment.

1. All five matters were resolved in favour of the Security Industry Authority. The Crown Court decisions in Stewart and Sansara were wrong to treat the appellate courts as having a discretion to consider the merits. The appeals in Rahim and Bakr and the judicial review claim in Egenti were likewise rejected.

2. Sections 8(3) and 11(5) of the Private Security Industry Act 2001 required the Authority and the statutory appeal courts to apply the criteria applicable at the relevant time. The statutory language conferred no discretion to disapply or qualify a criterion by considering the circumstances or gravity of the underlying offence.

3. The word criteria meant rules by which applications were to be judged, rather than non-binding guidelines. Section 7(3)(a) concerned the Authority’s selection of appropriate criteria; it did not permit the Authority or the courts to disregard criteria once selected. The published criteria were rules, not guidelines, and were deliberately sharp-edged.

4. The criteria were intra vires. The statutory purpose authorised automatic disqualification for defined offences within defined periods. Requiring an investigation into the facts of each conviction would be impractical, costly and uncertain, and would risk diverting the Authority from its licensing function and undermining public confidence.

5. The Convention arguments did not alter that conclusion. Any previous permission to work as a door supervisor presented serious difficulties as a possession under Article 1 of the First Protocol; in any event, the scheme was proportionate to the public interest in excluding criminality from door supervision. Article 6 added nothing because the courts had authority to determine the rights created by the Act. Article 8 was not engaged by a general inability to work in this profession and, even if engaged, the scheme was proportionate. No separate Article 14 issue arose.

The judgment itself records that:

• Crown Courts allowed the appeals in Stewart and Sansara, holding that the merits of the convictions could be considered.
• Magistrates’ courts dismissed the appeals in Rahim, Bakr and Egenti.
• High Court (Administrative Court) resolved all five matters in favour of the Security Industry Authority.