Hill v Bedfordshre County Council

A public authority’s decision is unlawful where it proceeds on a material mistake of fact and the court cannot conclude that the decision would inevitably have been the same without the mistake. A local authority may have power under section 2 of the Local Government Act 2000 and section 15A of the Education Act 1996 to fund further education for a person with special educational needs. A statement of special educational needs does not lapse automatically merely because the authority is no longer responsible for the child under Part IV of the Education Act 1996. Where the authority decides to cease maintaining the statement, it must follow the statutory procedure and notify the parents of their appeal rights.

The claimant, who had special educational needs, was educated at Cademuir International School under a statement maintained by the defendant local authority. When Cademuir closed, he began attending Elmwood College, a further education college, at his parents’ expense.

The authority initially maintained that it had no power to fund Elmwood and that the statement would lapse because the claimant was aged 18 and was no longer attending a school. It later accepted that it had a discretionary power under section 2 of the Local Government Act 2000, but refused to exercise it. The claimant sought judicial review of that decision and of the failure to give notice of, and an appeal right against, the cessation of the statement.

The central issues were whether the funding decision was vitiated by a material factual error and whether the authority had lawfully ceased to maintain the statement.

1. Funding decision. The authority had power under section 2 of the Local Government Act 2000 to fund the claimant’s education at Elmwood College. The section conferred a broad discretion, subject to the statutory objectives, including promoting or improving the economic or social well-being of the area and benefiting residents.
2. The decision communicated on 21 March 2007 proceeded on the material factual error that the claimant’s parents had not approached the Learning and Skills Council for funding. The documentary evidence showed that they had done so and that funding was likely to take a substantial period. The court could not say that the decision would necessarily have been the same had the error not occurred. The decision was therefore unlawful and was quashed.
3. The material-error principle in E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] QB 1044 was applicable. The court was not required to accept later witness statements or after-the-event rationalisations where they were inconsistent with the written reasons for the decision.
4. For completeness, section 15A of the Education Act 1996 also empowered the authority to fund the claimant’s education at Elmwood. The judge expressed grave reservations about naming one institution in a statement when it was known that another institution would provide all the education, except where provision genuinely occurred at more than one establishment.
5. Cessation of the statement. The claimant remained a child within Part IV of the Education Act 1996, although he was not a child for whom the authority was responsible under section 321(3). Following Wolverhampton City Council v The Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal [2007] EWHC 1117 (Admin), that did not cause the statement to lapse automatically or remove the parents’ right of appeal.
6. The authority was entitled to decide that it need not maintain the statement, but it had to comply with paragraph 11(2) of Schedule 27 by giving notice of the proposed cessation and notifying the claimant’s parents of their right of appeal. Its failure to give that notification was unlawful.

The claim was brought in the Administrative Court. Dobbs J granted permission for an oral hearing on the challenge concerning cessation of the statement; the funding ground was later amended and reconsidered. This court determined both grounds.