Taylor v The Government of the United States of America

In extradition proceedings, a civil default judgment based on deemed admissions does not, without more, create a real risk of an unfair criminal trial. The receiving court may protect the accused through jury directions and other safeguards.

A health-based objection under Article 3 of the Convention and section 91 of the Extradition Act 2003 requires a high threshold. The court must carefully assess both the risk and the extent of the danger, including available medical arrangements.

Article 8 requires a proportionality assessment in the particular case. The relevant balance is between the disruption to the individual and the proper requirements of international comity. A possible future sentence cannot ordinarily establish a real risk of Article 3 ill-treatment where conviction and sentence remain uncertain and mitigation remains available.

The claimant appealed against a District Judge’s decision to send his case to the Secretary of State for consideration of extradition to the United States. The Secretary of State subsequently ordered extradition.

The extradition request concerned alleged conspiracy to commit securities fraud and wire fraud. The claimant relied on a United States civil default judgment arising from related facts, arguing that it prejudged the criminal case and created a risk of an unfair trial. He also relied on serious heart disease, the risks of travel, and the possibility of a lengthy prison sentence. The issues were whether extradition was incompatible with Articles 3, 6 or 8 of the Convention, and whether it was unjust or oppressive under section 91 of the Extradition Act 2003.

1. Appeal dismissed. The District Judge’s decision was upheld.
2. The civil proceedings in the United States had ended in a default judgment stating that the allegations were deemed admitted. That did not amount to factual findings capable, by itself, of prejudicing the criminal trial. The claimant could explain the basis of the judgment, and the criminal court could prevent inappropriate use of it by excluding the jury’s knowledge of it or giving appropriate directions. There was therefore no real risk of a flagrant denial of justice under Article 6. [2004] 2 AC 323 was applied as to the limited role of Article 6 in extradition.
3. The health objection required a high threshold under Article 3 and section 91(2) of the Extradition Act 2003. The court accepted the approach in McCaughey v Government of the United States of America, [2006] EWHC 248 (Admin): each case requires careful assessment of the risk and the extent of the danger. The proposed provision of oxygen, medical assistance and monitoring materially reduced the travel risk. The evidence did not establish that extradition would be unjust or oppressive.
4. Article 8 was engaged, but extradition pursued a legitimate purpose and proportionality had to be assessed on the particular facts. References to an exceptional case in Launder v United Kingdom, [1998] 25 EHRR CB 67, and R(Bermingham) v the Director of the Serious Fraud Office, [2006] EWHC 200, were treated as a matter of terminology. The practical question was whether the disruption to the individual outweighed the requirements of international comity. It did not.
5. The possible sentence could not establish a real risk of Article 3 ill-treatment. The claimant had not been convicted, the sentence was uncertain, and his medical condition could be advanced in mitigation. The case was materially different from Wellington v Governor of HMP Belmarsh, [2004] 2 AC 368.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal from the District Judge’s decision was dismissed. The extradition decision was upheld.