Bolt, R (on the application of) v Merseyside Police & Anor

A review under the Police (Conduct) Regulations 1999 is materially narrower than an appeal. A reviewing officer should not substitute a different view of sanction unless the original sanction is so plainly excessive that it is properly characterised as unfair. Where another chief officer conducts the review under regulation 37, that officer acts as the reviewing officer. The decision takes effect by substitution and the home chief officer has no power to reject it. However, a reviewing decision which materially mischaracterises the misconduct or applies the wrong approach to sanction may be unlawful. Deliberate dishonesty by a police officer in an operational context, involving concealment of misconduct, was capable of justifying dismissal.

The claimant, a police constable, was dismissed by a disciplinary panel after findings that he had dishonestly concealed an unauthorised visit, failed to investigate a reported robbery and lied about his location. He sought a review under the Police (Conduct) Regulations 1999. Because of a potential conflict within the Merseyside force, the review was conducted by the Chief Constable of North Wales under regulation 37(2).

The reviewing officer upheld the findings but substituted a fine and ordered reinstatement. The Chief Constable of Merseyside rejected that decision and maintained the dismissal. The central issues were whether the reviewing officer’s decision was binding, whether the sanction fell within the scope of review, and whether the reviewing decision was lawful.

1. The review decision was binding. Under regulations 34–37 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 1999, a chief officer from another force conducting a review under regulation 37(2) acts in the capacity of reviewing officer. Regulation 36(3) therefore required his decision to take effect by substitution for the panel’s decision. The home chief officer’s role was limited to implementing it. The reference in the guidance to a recommendation could not override the clear wording of the Regulations.
2. The review was not a rehearing. The review procedure was distinct from an appeal to a Police Appeals Tribunal. Its purpose was to rectify clear errors or inconsistencies and to assess whether the hearing was fair and whether the outcome appeared justified and appropriate. A reviewing officer could not overturn the panel’s sanction merely because he would have imposed a different penalty. Intervention required a sanction so plainly excessive that it was properly characterised as unfair. The court adopted the exposition in R (Independent Police Complaints Commission) v Hayman [2007] EWHC (Admin) 2136.
3. The reviewing officer’s decision was unlawful. The panel had found deliberate dishonesty in an operational context: the claimant knowingly failed to investigate a reported crime, lied contemporaneously about his location and maintained the deception subsequently. That conduct went to the heart of police integrity. Dismissal was not an inappropriate sanction, although it was not held to be the only possible sanction. The reviewing officer’s contrary conclusion resulted from an incomplete characterisation of the misconduct and questionable reasoning concerning alleged bias, alternative charges and other sanctions.
4. The court could consider the lawfulness of the reviewing decision in these proceedings, although the reviewing officer had not been made a defendant. Since that decision could not stand, refusing relief achieved substantially the same result as quashing it: the disciplinary panel’s decision remained in force, subject to the claimant’s appeal to a Police Appeals Tribunal.

The judgment was a first-instance judicial review. The claimant had previously been dismissed by a disciplinary panel under the Police (Conduct) Regulations 1999. A review by the Chief Constable of North Wales substituted a lesser sanction and ordered reinstatement. The High Court held that review decision unlawful and refused substantive relief.