Stankovic v Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police

Reasonable suspicion may be based on intelligence and material that would not itself be admissible at trial. The question is whether the information, viewed cumulatively, supplies reasonable grounds for suspicion at the relevant time. A search warrant authorises seizure only within its terms. Police may remove material reasonably believed to contain evidence, but must sort it promptly and return irrelevant items. Indiscriminate seizure may amount to trespass to goods and negligence, even where the warrant was lawfully obtained. Improper conduct in parts of an investigation does not, without more, establish malice or misfeasance in public office. No duty of care was owed by the police in investigating suspected crime.

The claimant, a British Army major, was arrested in 1997 on suspicion of offences under the Official Secrets Act 1989 arising from his contacts with Bosnian Serb leaders and his possession of documents from Bosnia. He was arrested again in 1998 and interviewed after a lengthy investigation. The Crown Prosecution Service later decided that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute, and no Army disciplinary proceedings followed.

The claimant claimed damages against the Chief Constable for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and malicious process, misfeasance in public office, negligence, trespass to land and trespass to goods. The central issues were whether the investigation, warrants, arrests and interviews were lawfully justified, whether the police acted with an improper motive, and whether the seizure of irrelevant items was actionable.

1. Disposition. The claims for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, malicious process, misfeasance in public office, negligence and trespass to land failed. The claim for trespass to goods succeeded in respect of items seized outside the terms of the warrant.
2. Reasonable suspicion and warrants. The police were entitled to rely on intelligence, the results of a covert search and the claimant’s continued unauthorised contacts with Bosnian Serb leaders. Evidence need not be admissible at trial to support reasonable suspicion. The anonymous intelligence required corroboration under the relevant Code of Practice, which was supplied by the other information. The warrant was lawfully obtained under section 9 of the Official Secrets Act 1911.
3. Malice and arrest. The requirements identified in Gibbs v Rea [1998] AC 786 were not established. The police had a genuine belief that the warrant requirements were met and acted for the purpose of investigating suspected offences. Both arrests were supported by reasonable grounds. The operational decision to arrest rather than invite a voluntary interview was not oppressive.
4. Search and seizure. Applying the guidance in Reynolds v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1985] 1 QB 881, the police could remove documents reasonably believed to contain evidence, subject to prompt and reasonable sorting. The seizure of numerous irrelevant items, including personal and household articles, was indiscriminate and outside the warrant. It amounted to negligent trespass to goods. The evidence did not establish deliberate wrongdoing or justify exemplary damages.
5. Other causes of action. The negligence claim could not survive in light of Brooks v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2005] 1WLR 1495, because no duty of care was owed in the circumstances. Any damages for trespass to goods were limited to loss caused by the search and did not include the claimant’s resignation or consequential career loss.

First-instance liability judgment in the High Court. The judgment does not state any prior appellate decision.