Collis, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government & Anor

A compulsory purchase resolution must be construed in its own terms. It need not identify every property or statutory power with technical precision if, read in context, its language objectively authorises the making of a compulsory purchase order. Preparatory wording may encompass the formal order where that is the only sensible meaning of the resolution.

Advice in the accompanying report cannot alter or qualify the resolution’s legal effect. The resolution is construed as it stands. Confirmation by the Secretary of State does not cure a formally invalid order, although the court left that issue undecided because the order was valid.

The claimant challenged a compulsory purchase order made by the London Borough of Tower Hamlets in respect of seven long-leasehold flats at Priestman Point. The order was made under the Housing Act 1985 and the Acquisition of Land Act 1981, and was later confirmed by the Secretary of State following a public inquiry.

The challenge concerned the authority given by a Cabinet resolution approving the initiation and management of back-up compulsory purchase processes for several blocks on the Crossways Estate. The central issue was whether that resolution authorised the order ultimately made, or merely preparatory steps.

1. Validity of the order. The application under section 23(1) of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 was dismissed. The Cabinet resolution of 9 February 2005 validly authorised the compulsory purchase order made on 7 December 2005.
2. The resolution had to be construed as it stood. The Chief Legal Officer’s advice in the accompanying report could not be imported into, or used to qualify, the resolution’s terms. Although the wording was jargonish, the sensible meaning of authorising the council to initiate and manage back-up compulsory purchase processes was a reference to making a compulsory purchase order.
3. The order was the first step in a wider statutory process, including confirmation by the Secretary of State, notices to treat and entry, or vesting declaration procedures, and the assessment of compensation. The resolution therefore did not merely authorise administrative preparation. The absence of precise flat numbers and specific statutory powers did not invalidate the authority, particularly since the report identified the properties and the council had been advised about the relevant powers.
4. The court did not need to determine the alternative submission that the council’s constitutional arrangements under section 15 of the Local Government Act 2000 enabled the Director of Housing Management to authorise the order. The evidence indicated that this argument was likely sound, but the point was not required for the decision.
5. The court was not persuaded that confirmation by the Secretary of State would have validated an invalid order. Nor was it necessary to decide whether the discretionary wording of section 24(4) of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 would have justified refusing to quash such an order.
6. The application was dismissed. The claimant’s application for permission to appeal was refused. Costs were to be addressed by written submissions.