Araromi, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

In a discretionary immigration decision, the decision-maker must take relevant considerations into account and reach a decision within the range of decisions reasonably open to it. A later decision may demonstrate that discretion was exercised and that the relevant matters were considered. A court does not substitute its own view merely because another decision might have been made. Under section 82(2)(e) of the 2002 Act, the relevant time for determining whether variation of leave triggers a right of appeal is when the variation takes effect, namely when it is notified or decided, rather than the later date on which the reduced leave expires.

The claimant, a Nigerian national employed in the United Kingdom under a work permit, sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s refusal to grant indefinite leave to remain outside the Immigration Rules. His full-time teaching employment had ended, although he continued to work periodically as a supply teacher. The Secretary of State issued a further decision during the proceedings addressing discretion, relevant factors, human rights matters and the alleged right of appeal against curtailment of leave.

The remaining issues were whether discretion had been properly exercised, whether the decision was unreasonable, and whether the claimant had been denied a right of appeal.

1. Discretion and reasonableness. The application for indefinite leave to remain fell outside the relevant Immigration Rules. The further decision made it unarguable that the Secretary of State had failed to exercise discretion or had ignored relevant matters, including the matters identified when permission was granted and the grounds advanced in the proceedings.
2. The applicable question was whether relevant factors had been taken into account and whether the decision fell outside the range of decisions open to the Secretary of State. The court was not concerned with whether another decision-maker might have reached a different conclusion. Given the claimant’s failure to comply with the basis of his work permit, his conscious decision not to notify the relevant department of the change in employment, and the rationale of the work-permit regime, the refusal was within that range.
3. Right of appeal. The passport entries did not provide a sound basis for determining the date of curtailment. The operative date was the date stated in the notification letter, 23 April 2006. On the proper construction of section 82(2)(e) of the 2002 Act, the phrase referring to when variation takes effect meant when the variation was notified, or alternatively when the underlying decision was made. It did not mean the later date on which the curtailed leave expired. No right of appeal arose on the facts.
4. The Article 8 arguments were no longer pursued. The court considered it sensible that those issues should be addressed, if necessary, in the context of any future refusal of leave or removal decision.
5. The application was refused. The dismissal was directed to take effect on 15 January, with the order to lie in the office until then. No order for costs was made; costs were left to lie where they fell.