Chababe v Bonn Public Prosecutors Office

Passage of time bars extradition only where extradition would be unjust or oppressive. Delay caused by the requested person’s flight, concealment or evasion of arrest cannot ordinarily support that bar. Exceptional circumstances may justify a different result, but substantial prejudice caused by the person’s own absconding will not normally qualify. The burden lies on the requested person, on the balance of probabilities.

The claimant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against the Deputy Senior District Judge’s decision that the passage of time did not bar his extradition to Germany. A warrant had been issued in 1989 for attempted rape. The claimant was arrested in England in 2006 after the German authorities learned of his whereabouts.

The claimant accepted that the German authorities had not acted dilatorily and that extradition would not otherwise be oppressive. The central issue was whether the judge had been entitled to find that he had fled Germany to evade arrest and, if so, whether exceptional circumstances nevertheless made extradition unjust or oppressive.

1. Appeal dismissed. The statutory bar under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 applies where extradition would be unjust or oppressive by reason of the passage of time. The burden of proof rests on the requested person on the balance of probabilities.
2. The approach in Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779, concerning the distinction between prejudice to the fairness of the trial and hardship arising from changed circumstances, was applicable. Delay caused by the requested person’s flight, concealment of whereabouts or evasion of arrest cannot ordinarily be relied upon to establish injustice or oppression.
3. The Deputy Senior District Judge was entitled to find that the claimant had fled Germany to avoid detection. She had seen and heard him, gave clear and cogent reasons, and relied on evidence from which the inference was properly drawn. There was no proper basis for disturbing that finding on appeal.
4. No exceptional circumstances displaced the ordinary rule. The delay resulted from the claimant’s own conduct, and any resulting difficulty in defending the allegation was of his own making. The judge’s decision was therefore correct.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 was dismissed.
• City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court: The Deputy Senior District Judge held that the passage of time did not bar extradition.