Haw & Anor v City of Westminster Magistrates' Court

An order made under Contempt of Court Act 1981, section 12, may be appealed to the Crown Court against both conviction and sentence. The specific appeal provision in section 12(5) prevails over the general appeal provision in section 13 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960. A separate appeal by case stated, and judicial review on appropriate public-law grounds, remain available in the High Court. Where necessary, section 12(5) may be given a purposive construction, or corrected for an obvious drafting error, so as to give effect to Parliament’s intention.

Brian Haw and Barbara Tucker were convicted of contempt of court under section 12 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 by the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court and fined. They sought to challenge the convictions. Uncertainty arose because R v Havant Justices ex parte Palmer (1985) 149 JP 609 had suggested that section 12(5) permitted an appeal to the Crown Court against sentence but not conviction.

The Administrative Court had to determine the correct appellate route, including whether an appeal lay to the Crown Court, whether section 13 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 created a concurrent right of appeal, and whether case stated proceedings or judicial review remained available.

1. The court held that an appeal lies to the Crown Court from both conviction and sentence under section 12 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. Section 12(5) applies the appeal provisions of section 108 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, under which a defendant who did not plead guilty may appeal against conviction or sentence.

2. The legislative history supported that construction. Parliament intended to provide a swift appeal to the Crown Court, by way of complete rehearing, for persons punished for contempt in the face of a magistrates’ court. There was no rational basis for allowing an appeal against sentence but not conviction.

3. The court rejected the restrictive observations in R v Havant Justices ex parte Palmer (1985) 149 JP 609. Those observations were unnecessary to the decision in that case, and the syntactical reasoning relied on an incorrect understanding of section 59 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933.

4. Applying the principles in Pepper v Hart [1993] A.C. 593, the court took account of clear ministerial statements of legislative purpose. It also held, applying Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution [2000] 1 W.L.R. 586, that any drafting error could be corrected because the intended purpose, the inadvertent failure to express it, and the substance of the correction were sufficiently clear.

5. There was no concurrent appeal under section 13 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960. The specific provisions of section 12(5) were intended to govern appeals from the statutory contempt jurisdiction and prevailed over the general provisions of section 13. However, an appeal by case stated under section 111 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, and judicial review on the ordinary limited grounds of public law, remained available.

6. The appellants’ appeals were directed to be listed as soon as practicable at Southwark Crown Court.

• City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court: convicted both appellants of contempt of court under section 12 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 and imposed fines and costs.
• High Court (Administrative Court): held that the proper route against conviction or sentence was an appeal to the Crown Court and directed that the appellants’ appeals be listed there.