Zoolife International Ltd, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs

A court should ordinarily refuse to decide an academic judicial-review claim. It may exceptionally do so only where there is a good public-interest reason. In this context, that will ordinarily require other similar cases to exist or be anticipated, and a conclusion that does not depend on detailed or disputed facts.

The court also stated obiter that an enforceable common-law duty of confidence may adequately protect confidential information seen by a statutory inspector, absent evidence of a likely breach or an inadequate remedy. The proper apparent-bias question remains whether a fair-minded and informed observer would see a real possibility of bias.

The claimant veterinary consultancy provided specialist aquatic-animal services and research support to the London Aquarium. It contended that the nomination of Sue Thornton, a partner in a competing veterinary group, as a Part I inspector under the Zoo Licensing Act 1981 risked exposing its confidential research and trade secrets.

The Aquarium formally objected, but the Secretary of State declined to nominate a replacement. Before the inspection occurred, the Aquarium ended its contract with the claimant and withdrew its objection. A different inspector was appointed after the claimant obtained interim injunctive relief, and the inspection and licence renewal proceeded.

The claimant nevertheless sought declarations challenging the earlier refusal, its reasons, and the alleged appearance of bias. The central issues were whether the claim had become academic and, if not, whether the refusal was irrational, inadequately reasoned, or affected by apparent bias.

1. Claim dismissed. The claim had become academic. Applying R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Salem [1999] 1 AC 450, the court held that an academic public-law claim should not be heard without a good public-interest reason. In this type of case, exceptional circumstances would ordinarily require both anticipated similar cases and an issue that was not fact-sensitive.

2. Neither condition was met. A future objection by another aquarium would depend on its own services, confidential information, relationship with the proposed inspector, representations by affected parties, and the Secretary of State's reasons. The present claim also depended on assumed facts because the Aquarium, local authority and proposed inspector had not participated. A decision would therefore have little precedential or practical value.

3. The court nevertheless considered the merits obiter. The Secretary of State's reasons were adequate. Statutory inspection could require access to confidential records, and inspectors and recipients of their reports would be bound by the common-law duty of confidence. In the absence of any evidence that Sue Thornton was likely to misuse information, that such misuse had occurred before, or that a confidence action would be inadequate, it was not irrational to regard that duty as an adequate answer to the objection.

4. The Secretary of State was also entitled to determine the weight to give relevant matters. No separate balancing exercise was required once the confidentiality concern had been reasonably addressed.

5. There was no apparent bias. Applying the fair-minded and informed observer test in Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357, the proposed inspector was an adviser within a team rather than the decision-maker; there was no evidence that her professional duties would be affected by her employer's relationship with the claimant; and the claimant, rather than the Aquarium, was the party said to be disadvantaged. The prior dispute did not involve her. The application was dismissed.

not stated in the judgment.