Blackman & Ors. v Man

Testamentary capacity requires capacity to understand the nature and effect of making a will, the extent of the property being disposed of, the claims of potential beneficiaries, and the absence of a disorder or delusion affecting the testamentary decision. Actual knowledge of the precise value of an estate is unnecessary. The court must assess whether the testator had capacity to understand and recognise those matters, rather than whether she demonstrably did so. Evidence of independently completed will instructions, considered dispositions and reasons for including or excluding beneficiaries may establish capacity. Prima facie, testamentary capacity and due execution establish knowledge and approval. Where the circumstances arouse suspicion, actual knowledge and approval must be proved, but accurate implementation of the testator’s instructions may suffice.

The claimants, who were the intestacy beneficiaries and relatives of the deceased, challenged two wills made in 1994. The wills left the residue of a substantial estate to the first and second defendants, close friends of the deceased. The challenges alleged lack of testamentary capacity and want of knowledge and approval. No allegation of undue influence was made.

The court considered medical and factual evidence concerning the deceased’s dementia, her completion of a bank will instruction form, the preparation and execution of the wills, and the circumstances in which the dispositions departed substantially from earlier testamentary arrangements. The central issues were whether the deceased had testamentary capacity and whether she knew and approved the contents of the wills.

1. Validity of the wills. The August 1994 will was pronounced valid and was the deceased’s last will. The claimants’ challenges failed.
2. Testamentary capacity. The applicable test was that in Banks v Goodfellow 1869-70 LR 5 QB 549. The deceased had to understand the nature and effect of making a will, the extent of the property disposed of, and the claims of those who might reasonably expect to benefit. No disorder of mind or insane delusion could affect her judgment or affections. Following Hoff v Atherton [2005] Wills & Trusts Law Report 999, the issue was whether she had capacity to understand and recognise those matters, not whether she actually understood or recognised them.
3. The court attached limited weight to retrospective opinions from experts who had not seen the deceased at the relevant time. The ultimate inferences were matters for the court. The independently completed Barclays form, its detailed legacies and the explanation for limiting gifts to family showed that the deceased understood the nature of a will and recalled relevant claims. She understood that she owned a substantial property portfolio through companies. Precise knowledge of its value was unnecessary. Her dispositions were not irrational, and there was no evidence that an insane delusion influenced them.
4. Knowledge and approval. The burden was on the defendants. Testamentary capacity and due execution ordinarily sufficed. The circumstances did not arouse suspicion within the principle discussed in Fuller v Strom [2002] 1 WLR 1097. In any event, each will accurately implemented the deceased’s written or subsequently clarified instructions, proving knowledge and approval.
5. Costs. The court declined to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the event. The claimants were ordered to pay the first and second defendants’ costs. The executor’s costs were payable out of the estate. There was no order as to the Attorney General’s costs.