Manchester City Council, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Environment Food and Rural Affairs

Under section 118B(7) of the Highways Act 1980, the decision-maker must consider the listed factors and all the circumstances. The words “in particular” do not require those factors to receive enhanced or predetermined weight. The weight given to legally relevant considerations is ordinarily a matter for the inspector’s judgment.

A decision letter must be read as a whole and in a common-sense manner. It need address the principal controversial issues and explain the decision intelligibly; it need not resolve every subsidiary factual dispute or repeat matters already addressed.

The claimant sought judicial review of an inspector’s decision not to confirm a special extinguishment order made under section 118B of the Highways Act 1980. The order proposed closing urban footpaths in Manchester on the ground that adjoining premises experienced high levels of crime and that the footpaths facilitated persistent criminal offences.

The inspector accepted the statutory crime-related conditions and found closure expedient for crime prevention, but concluded that the benefits of closure did not outweigh the public benefits of retaining the routes. The claimant challenged the decision on six grounds, principally alleging that the inspector had misapplied section 118B(7), failed to make adequate findings, and gave inadequate reasons.

1. Application dismissed. The inspector had correctly identified and applied the statutory framework.
2. Section 118B(7) required the inspector to have regard to all the circumstances and, in particular, the three listed matters: consistency with a crime and disorder strategy, the availability of a reasonably convenient alternative route or practicability of diversion, and the effect on land served by the highway. Those matters were mandatory considerations, but the subsection did not require them to receive most, enhanced or predetermined weight. The statutory language conferred a broad evaluative discretion.
3. The principle stated in Tesco Stores Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 WLR 759 applied. Whether a factor was legally material was a question of law; the weight given to it was a matter for the inspector, subject only to rationality.
4. The decision letter had to be read as a whole and in a common-sense manner. The inspector was not required to repeat matters already considered or resolve every detailed dispute about litter, graffiti, drug dealing and users’ perceptions. The critical issue was the level and frequency of use, on which the inspector made a clear finding that significant numbers regularly used the footpaths.
5. The inspector was entitled to infer that the existing footpaths had a real purpose and were more attractive to those regular users than the reasonably convenient alternative route. His balancing exercise was intelligible and rational, even though another inspector might have reached a different conclusion.
6. The inspector was entitled to take account of the petition. The weight given to oral evidence, written objections and a petition was a matter for the inspector. The observations in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Venables [1997] 1 All ER 327 arose in a different statutory context and did not assist the claimant.
7. The claimant’s reliance on R v The City of Westminster Housing Benefit Review Board ex p Mehanne [2001] UKHL 11 was misplaced. The relevant statutory structure and discretion differed, and the cited observation about “in particular” was not necessary to that decision.
8. The application was dismissed. Consequential applications concerning costs or permission to appeal were to be dealt with in writing, subject to liberty to apply for an oral hearing.