Director of Public Prosecutions v Wells & Anor

A temporary speed restriction imposed under Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 may be prosecuted under section 89, unless Parliament has expressly excluded the relevant provision. Sections 16 and 89 provide alternative routes where the underlying conduct is a breach of a temporary speed restriction. There is no general statutory distinction between a speed “restriction” and a speed “limit”, or between temporary and permanent limits.

Platten v Gowing was confined to its ratio: a person charged under the provision creating a temporary restriction should be sentenced under that provision’s dedicated penalty. Its wider observations about separate regimes and cumulative offences were obiter and were not followed.

The respondents were convicted of driving above temporary speed restrictions imposed under section 14 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. They had been charged under section 89, but the Crown Court held that the correct provision was section 16, following its understanding of Platten v Gowing. The prosecution appealed by way of case stated.

The issue was whether section 89 permitted prosecution for exceeding a temporary speed limit or a temporary speed restriction imposed under section 14, and whether Platten v Gowing required the contrary conclusion.

1. Appeal allowed. The Crown Court was wrong to conclude that prosecution under section 89 was unavailable and wrong to treat Platten v Gowing as requiring that conclusion. The matters were remitted to Southampton Crown Court for continuation of the respondents’ appeals.
2. Section 89 applies to driving at a speed exceeding a limit imposed by or under an enactment contained in the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. Section 14 imposes temporary restrictions, including speed restrictions, and section 89 contains no general exclusion for them. Section 17(2) is expressly excluded by section 89(3)(a); sections 16 and 88 are not. That statutory structure supports the conclusion that section 89 covers section 14 restrictions and the temporary speed limits in section 88 (paras [25], [31]–[32], [39]).
3. There is no justified distinction between “restriction” and “limit”, or between temporary and permanent speed controls. The expressions are used interchangeably in the statutory scheme. Nor is there a basis for distinguishing controls imposed by local authorities from those imposed by the Secretary of State (paras [35]–[38]).
4. Platten v Gowing was properly understood as deciding that a motorist charged under the temporary-restriction provision had to be sentenced under that provision’s dedicated penalty. Its wider remarks that a motorist could not be charged under the general speeding provision, that temporary and general limits formed separate regimes, and that one act could constitute two speeding offences were obiter. Those observations did not address the full statutory scheme and were, in any event, treated as per incuriam. The court declined to follow them (paras [25]–[28], [34]).
5. The later enactment of the 1984 Act, particularly the express exclusion of section 17(2) from section 89, displaced any wider effect that Platten v Gowing might previously have had (para [39]). Section 89 was also the tidier and fairer charging route because it preserved the statutory corroboration protection for the motorist (paras [7], [27]).
6. Both questions in the case stated were answered in the affirmative. There was no order as to costs (paras [41]–[43], [100]).

• Southampton Crown Court: On 5 March 2007, the Crown Court ruled on a preliminary issue that the respondents had been improperly charged under section 89 and should have been charged under section 16.
• High Court (Administrative Court): On appeal by way of case stated, the court allowed the prosecution’s appeal, answered both questions in the affirmative and remitted the respondents’ remaining appeals to Southampton Crown Court.