Crown Prosecution Service v Brown

The defence of duress is confined to criminal conduct directly caused by threats where the defendant has no reasonable evasive course. In a driving case, the defence may cease during the journey once the immediate threat has ended. A defendant cannot rely on duress for continuing to drive when no pursuit is taking place, there is no reasonable basis for believing that pursuit is taking place, and the defendant knows that fact.

The Crown Prosecution Service appealed by way of case stated from magistrates’ acquittal of the respondent, who admitted driving with excessive alcohol contrary to section 5(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 but relied on duress of circumstances.

The respondent had driven approximately three miles towards his grandmother’s home after receiving a threatening telephone call. The magistrates found that he feared serious injury and that a sober person of reasonable firmness sharing his characteristics would have acted similarly. The central issue was whether duress remained available when he was stopped, after the immediate threat had passed.

1. The court allowed the Crown’s appeal and remitted the case to the magistrates with a declaration that the respondent should be convicted.
2. Duress is available only where the criminal conduct is directly caused by the threats relied upon and where, in the circumstances, there is no evasive action which the defendant could reasonably have been expected to take. Those limitations were identified in R v Z and R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22.
3. The court did not need to decide whether duress was available when the respondent first entered his car and drove away. The defence plainly ceased to be available long before he was stopped.
4. When the respondent drove away, he saw the three men talking. They did not see him, did not chase him, and he had no grounds to think that they were pursuing him. He nevertheless continued driving for several minutes and approximately three miles. On those facts, the driving at the time of the stop was not caused by the threat and was not necessary to avoid it.
5. Director of Public Prosecutions v Jones [1990] RTR 33 demonstrated that duress or necessity may justify only the initial part of a journey where the defendant continues driving after the need for escape has ended. Director of Public Prosecutions v Bell [1992] RTR 335 and Director of Public Prosecutions v Tomkinson [2001] RTR 38; [2001] EWHC Admin 182 were treated as contrasting examples involving short-distance escape.

• High Court (Administrative Court): allowed the Crown Prosecution Service’s case-stated appeal from the magistrates’ acquittal and remitted the case with a declaration that the respondent should be convicted.