Wright, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government

On an application under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the court reviews the legality of the planning decision rather than substituting its own planning judgment. An inspector’s decision is sufficient if, read sensibly by an informed reader, it identifies the principal issue, addresses the material considerations and explains the conclusion. A disagreement with the inspector’s planning assessment is not an error of law. A policy applies only where its terms make it relevant; an alleged council error or earlier decision cannot make an inapplicable policy decisive. National policy supporting the re-use of rural buildings does not create a presumption in favour of permission where the proposal conflicts with applicable local policies. Procedural irregularity warrants intervention only where it causes material prejudice.

The claimant challenged under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 an inspector’s dismissal of his section 78 appeal. The appeal concerned refusal of planning permission for a substantial alteration and extension to Honeysuckle Cottage, a dwelling converted from a rural building.

The inspector concluded that the proposal would approximately double the building’s footprint and change it from a modest rural building into a substantial house, harming the character and appearance of the building and surrounding area. The claimant alleged inadequate reasons, failure to consider relevant planning decisions and policies, factual errors, and procedural unfairness arising from a document supplied at the hearing. The central issue was whether those matters disclosed an error of law justifying quashing the decision.

1. The application was dismissed. The inspector had identified the main issue as the effect of the proposal on the character and appearance of the existing building and surrounding area. His reasoning was sufficiently apparent to an informed reader.
2. The inspector was entitled to conclude that the proposal would dominate rather than respect the scale of the original rural building. The court was not required to agree with that planning judgment, and it could not properly second-guess the inspector’s assessment of the significance of changes to other properties.
3. The inspector had taken account of the relevant planning history and surrounding development. The earlier permissions were materially consistent with retaining a small and relatively affordable rural dwelling and controlling later extensions.
4. Policies FBE.1, FBE.6 and FBE.7 were accepted as relevant and were properly applied. Policy FH.9 was directed to development within defined settlement boundaries and did not become relevant merely because the local authority or earlier decisions had referred to it. In any event, its terms did not assist the proposed extension.
5. Planning Policy Statement 7 supported the re-use of appropriately located rural buildings, but added nothing beyond the local policies implemented by the district council. The words “particularly supportive” did not create a balance in favour of permission overriding material considerations such as the building’s scale, character and impact.
6. The inspector’s observation that works appeared to have significantly commenced was, at most, a preliminary observation which had no bearing on the core reasoning. The footprint assessment was open to him on the basis that the car port was not residential accommodation.
7. Although a copy of another appeal decision had been supplied at the informal hearing, the claimant’s representative could have requested sight of it or an adjournment. The document was not referred to by the inspector, and no material prejudice was established under rule 9 of the applicable inquiry procedure rules.
8. The defendant was awarded costs of £6,000 plus VAT.

The judgment does not state any further appellate history. It records the inspector’s dismissal of the claimant’s section 78 planning appeal.