Spiropoulos, R (on the application of) v Brighton and Hove City Council

An authority paying housing benefit must choose a time and manner of payment having regard to the claimant’s reasonable needs and convenience. Administrative advantages to the authority do not, alone, justify a payment method that creates avoidable difficulty for the claimant. Non-statutory guidance containing an obvious contradiction or typing error cannot rationally be followed in its printed form. A claimant’s asserted religious or practical objection must be assessed by reference to evidence of whether it genuinely prevents the proposed payment arrangement. Where the claimant can reasonably open a basic bank account, payment by crossed cheque into that account may satisfy the statutory obligation.

The claimant received housing benefit from Brighton and Hove City Council but refused to accept payment by crossed cheque because he had no bank account and did not wish, or claimed to be unable, to open one. The council relied on its longstanding payment arrangements and central Government guidance.

The judicial review concerned whether the council’s decision complied with regulation 88 of the Housing Benefit General Regulations 1987 SI 1987/1971, and, after the regulatory change, regulation 91 of the Housing Benefit Regulations 2006 SI 2006/213. The central issue was whether payment by crossed cheque was reasonable having regard to the claimant’s needs and convenience.

1. Claim dismissed. The council’s administrative advantages in using crossed cheques were insufficient by themselves to establish compliance with regulation 88, now regulation 91.
2. The governing obligation required the council to decide the time and manner of payment having regard to the claimant’s reasonable needs and convenience, as well as the timing and frequency of the rent liability.
3. The printed non-statutory guidance was irrational to the extent that it advised councils both that they could not insist on crossed cheques in every case and that they should send crossed cheques to claimants without bank accounts. The contradiction could only be resolved by treating the latter wording as containing a typing error. Reliance on the uncorrected guidance was therefore rejected.
4. The court would not assess the reasonableness of the claimant’s religious beliefs, since that risked engaging Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It could, however, assess whether the evidence established that the beliefs actually prohibited opening a bank account. The claimant had provided no plausible evidence of such a prohibition.
5. The council had arranged for housing benefit claimants to obtain basic bank accounts from the Co-operative Bank. The claimant had previously held a bank account and had produced photographic identification. His objections therefore did not arise from his reasonable needs or convenience. Payment by crossed cheque, in the circumstances, was reasonable and lawful.
6. The claimant was ordered to pay the council’s costs, subject to detailed assessment, although the judge expressed the expectation that the council would not pursue enforcement.