London Borough of Croydon v Wright

A challenge to a local authority’s later decision to enforce an existing possession order is not necessarily an application to postpone the effect of that order for the purposes of section 89 of the Housing Act 1980. The court retains jurisdiction where the later enforcement decision is alleged to be unlawful discrimination. Dyslexia and diabetes may constitute a statutory disability, depending on their effects in the particular case. Where there is a prima facie evidential link between disability, rent arrears and the enforcement decision, the issue ordinarily requires investigation rather than summary rejection. In urgent circumstances, the court may grant interim injunctive relief before proceedings are formally issued. An appeal limited to an adjournment decision does not circumvent the two-tier appellate structure.

The appellant was an unprotected tenant of the claimant local authority. A possession order had been made in 2004, but the authority initially declined to enforce it. In August 2007 it decided to enforce the order because of alleged rent arrears and arranged for execution of the warrant.

The appellant sought an adjournment, suspension of the warrant and permission to appeal, contending that dyslexia and diabetes affected her ability to manage her financial affairs and caused the arrears. The County Court rejected those applications and refused an interim injunction. The High Court considered whether section 89 of the Housing Act 1980 deprived the court of jurisdiction, whether the disability and discrimination allegations required investigation, whether the refusal of an adjournment was flawed, and whether interim relief could be granted before proceedings were issued.

1. Appeal allowed and matter remitted. The appeal against the refusal of an adjournment and interim protection was allowed. The renewed application for permission to appeal from the District Judge was remitted to the County Court for reconsideration by a different judge.
2. Section 89 of the Housing Act 1980 did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. The appellant was challenging the local authority’s later decision in 2007 to enforce the possession order, rather than seeking an order postponing the effect of the original possession order within section 89. The fact that the practical effect might be similar did not remove the distinction.
3. The later enforcement decision could be challenged under the Disability Discrimination Act if it was based on rent arrears attributable to disability. Dyslexia and diabetes could fall within the statutory concept of disability in appropriate circumstances. The County Court judge had erred in treating those conditions as incapable of satisfying the statutory definition.
4. The evidence disclosed a prima facie case that the appellant’s difficulty in managing her financial affairs was linked to the alleged disabilities and that this contributed to the rent arrears. Whether that link existed, and whether it influenced the authority’s decision, were factual questions requiring investigation. The fact that the authority needed no reason to enforce the possession order did not prevent a reason actually relied upon from being legally challengeable.
5. The refusal of an adjournment was flawed. The relevant delay concerned the period from notification of the intention to enforce the order, rather than the three-and-a-half years since the original possession order. The judge had also refused an opportunity to obtain evidence precisely when further evidence was sought.
6. The court had jurisdiction in an urgent case to grant an injunction before proceedings were instituted, ordinarily on an undertaking that proceedings would subsequently be brought. Such relief was not excluded by section 89. The appeal did not undermine the two-tier appellate structure because it concerned only the refusal of an adjournment, leaving the question of permission to appeal for the County Court.

• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): The appeal from decisions of His Honour Judge Atkins dated 28 September 2007 was allowed. The matter was remitted to the County Court for a different judge to reconsider the renewed application for permission to appeal from District Judge Fink.