Gibbs v Harding & Ors

A testamentary gift expressed to be held in trust should not be construed as an absolute gift unless the will as a whole displaces the ordinary meaning of those words. A gift to inhabitants, or a class of inhabitants, of a locality may be charitable even where no particular charitable purpose is stated. The gift is then construed as limited to charitable purposes. An express purpose must itself be charitable and cannot be validated merely by localising the beneficiaries. Uncertainty in a charitable class does not necessarily invalidate the gift, since a scheme may resolve it. A racial description does not invalidate an otherwise charitable gift; the statutory mechanism is to disregard the colour restriction.

Sister Joseph Harding executed a manuscript will while seriously ill. After revoking an earlier professionally drawn will, she stated that, if she died before making another will, everything she possessed should be taken over by the Diocese of Westminster to hold in trust for the Black community of four London boroughs.

The claimant sought determination of the effect of the clause. The competing constructions were an absolute gift to the Diocese, a trust for the Caribbean Community Centre, a charitable trust, or an intestacy. The central issue was whether the wording created a valid testamentary gift and, if so, the terms on which it took effect.

1. The claim was determined in favour of the charitable construction. The clause took effect as a gift to the Roman Catholic Diocese of Westminster on charitable trusts, with the precise trusts to be settled by scheme.

2. The court rejected the argument that the words expressing the testatrix’s wish merely governed an absolute gift. The words in trust immediately followed the identification of the recipient, and nothing else in the will displaced their ordinary meaning. The proposed construction therefore required an impermissible re-ordering of the language.

3. A trust for a fluctuating body of individuals, such as inhabitants of a locality, can take effect only as a charitable trust. A gift to inhabitants of a locality, or to a particular class of inhabitants, without specifying a particular purpose is construed as implicitly limited to charitable purposes. Where an express purpose is stated, that purpose must itself be charitable. Localising a non-charitable purpose does not validate it.

4. The reference to the Black community was not an express non-charitable purpose. In context, “community” meant people, and the expression did not exclude a charitable intention. Any uncertainty in the class could be cured by a scheme. Nor did the racial description invalidate the gift. Section 34(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976 presupposed that a charitable instrument could contain a benefit defined by colour and provided the appropriate mechanism by disregarding that restriction.

5. The proposed trust for the Caribbean Community Centre failed because the will did not identify that body as the beneficiary and the evidence did not establish sufficiently what kind of entity it was. The intestacy construction was necessarily excluded by the conclusion that the charitable gift was valid.

First-instance decision. No earlier appellate decision was stated in the judgment.