Nigeria v Santolina Investment Corp & Ors

Summary judgment should be refused where allegations of serious personal corruption depend materially on disputed witness evidence, hearsay, unexplored explanations or inferences that may be tested by direct evidence at trial. The court must assess whether the defence has a realistic prospect of success without conducting a mini-trial, while considering evidence reasonably expected to be available at trial. Fraud is not an absolute bar to summary judgment, but the risk of a finding of dishonesty may itself provide a compelling reason for a trial. A fuller investigation is particularly appropriate where it may add to or alter the evidence and affect the outcome.

The Federal Republic of Nigeria sought summary judgment against the defendants to recover properties and funds alleged to represent the proceeds of corruption by Mr Alamieyeseigha, a former Governor of Bayelsa State. The claim depended on Nigerian law and on documentary evidence, witness statements and inferences concerning payments, property acquisitions and bank accounts. Mr Alamieyeseigha contested the application and advanced explanations for the assets. Several defendants did not participate.

The central issue was whether the evidence established that the defendants had no real prospect of successfully defending the claim and whether there was any other compelling reason for the issues to proceed to trial.

1. The application was refused. The court accepted, for the purpose of the application, the uncontradicted expert evidence that Nigeria had an independent cause of action under Nigerian law to recover property acquired in breach of the anti-corruption provisions of the Nigerian Constitution. That conclusion was a finding of fact on the evidence before the court and was not a precedent binding on a Nigerian court.
2. Under Part 24 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the court had to consider whether each defendant had a realistic, rather than fanciful, prospect of success and whether there was any other compelling reason for trial. The court had to avoid a mini-trial, but was not required to accept unsupported factual assertions without analysis. It had to consider evidence reasonably expected to be available at trial.
3. The claim involved serious allegations of personal corruption in public office. Only in exceptional circumstances would it be appropriate to enter judgment without giving the accused an opportunity to confront the evidence and present his case. The evidence included materially inconsistent accounts, second or third-hand hearsay, evidence said to have been obtained in circumstances requiring investigation, and explanations which had not been put to relevant witnesses.
4. The case concerning the UBS account and Falcon depended substantially on inferences from payments which Mr Aliyu had not been asked to explain. The case concerning the properties also required further investigation of the evidence of Mr Ayeni and others. The case against Mrs Alamieyeseigha rested entirely on inference. Even the documentary material required closer examination than was permissible on a summary judgment application.
5. Although the papers disclosed a strong case and Mr Alamieyeseigha had much to explain, there were reasonable grounds for believing that fuller investigation would add to or alter the evidence available at trial. The fact that part of the claim against S & P had to proceed to trial, and that the evidential substratum was common to the defendants, was a further compelling reason not to enter judgment against the unrepresented defendants.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.