Vranicki v Architects Registration Board

An appeal under section 22 of the Architects Act 1997 is a rehearing, although the court will normally rely on the tribunal record. It will be slow to interfere with factual findings falling within the reasonable range open to the tribunal and will recognise the tribunal’s professional expertise, particularly on questions of degree.

Serious professional incompetence and unacceptable professional conduct overlap. A disciplinary sanction requires a serious lapse. Several shortcomings which are not individually serious may establish serious professional incompetence when considered cumulatively. An architect supervising building works must take reasonable steps to maintain control, secure suitable contractual arrangements, co-ordinate contractors, monitor progress and issue necessary instructions.

Vranicki appealed under section 22 of the Architects Act 1997 against a decision of the Professional Conduct Committee of the Architects Registration Board dated 15 July 2005. The Committee dismissed allegations concerning professional conduct, contractual compliance, communication and design, but found serious professional incompetence established in relation to contractual protection and administration of a domestic building project.

The appeal challenged the adequacy of the contractual arrangements, project administration and advice concerning a Party Wall Notice. It also raised delay, procedural fairness and the late service of supplementary expert evidence. The central issues were the scope of the statutory appeal, the proper approach to the Committee’s factual and professional evaluations, and whether the proved matters amounted to serious professional incompetence.

The appeal was dismissed.

1. The appeal under section 22 of the Architects Act 1997 was at large and constituted a rehearing within CPR 52.11, as modified by paragraph 22.3 of the Practice Direction to CPR 52. The court would ordinarily rely on the transcript and would not receive fresh evidence.

2. The court should be reluctant to interfere with factual findings unless they exceeded the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement was possible, applying the approach in [2003] 1 W.L.R. 577. It should also recognise the Professional Conduct Committee’s expertise. Although the court would not simply defer to the Committee on professional standards, it should be cautious about differing from an evaluation based on professional degree.

3. The distinction between serious professional incompetence and unacceptable professional conduct did not require different standards. The statutory word serious required a serious lapse. The guidance’s reference to conduct falling dramatically below the expected standard imposed an unnecessarily high gloss on the Act.

4. An architect supervising works must take reasonable steps to keep the project under control. That includes advising on appropriate contractual arrangements, ensuring effective liaison between contractors, monitoring progress, identifying defective or delayed work, and issuing appropriate written instructions. A separate contract with a specialist contractor was not itself objectionable, but the architect had to advise on the terms required for liaison and the obligations of the main contractor.

5. The Committee had erred in treating the individual particulars as separate charges requiring separate findings of serious professional incompetence. The statutory charges were unacceptable professional conduct and serious professional incompetence. The proper question was whether the proved matters, considered together, established either charge. The error did not affect the result because the Committee had found that the principal matters independently justified the finding.

6. The failure to record oral advice about a Party Wall Notice was not, standing alone, serious professional incompetence. It was relevant as part of the wider failure to maintain sufficient control over the project. The Committee was nevertheless entitled to find that the proved contractual and administrative failures, viewed cumulatively, amounted to serious professional incompetence.

7. The delay did not make a fair hearing impossible, and the late supplementary statement did not amend the charges or cause unfairness. The Committee was entitled to dismiss the appeal-related procedural objections and its decision was not irrational.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal from the Professional Conduct Committee’s decision dated 15 July 2005 was dismissed.