King v Royal Society for the Protection of Cruelty To Animals

A magistrates’ court may vary or rescind an invalid sentence or order under section 142 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, but the power is discretionary. The question is whether intervention is in the interests of justice. An invalid animal-keeping disqualification may therefore be replaced by a lawful order where the magistrates reasonably reassess the matter in light of the statutory power. The Administrative Court will interfere with the exercise of that discretion only where it is unreasonable, perverse, or made without regard to relevant matters. It will not substitute its view merely because the replacement sentence is severe.

The claimant pleaded guilty before the magistrates to six offences under section 1 of the Protection of Animals Act 1911. Following discussions between the prosecution and defence, the magistrates imposed a lifetime disqualification from keeping animals, subject to exceptions for specified dogs.

After this court decided Royal Society for the Protection of Cruelty to Animals v Chester Crown Court [2006] EWHC Admin 1273, the prosecution applied under section 142 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. The magistrates held that the original order was invalid, reopened the matter, and imposed a 15-year disqualification from having custody of dogs. The issue was whether they had properly exercised their statutory discretion.

1. The appeal by way of case stated was dismissed. The original disqualification order was invalid, but the magistrates lawfully replaced it with a 15-year disqualification.

2. Following Royal Society for the Protection of Cruelty to Animals v Chester Crown Court [2006] EWHC Admin 1273, the power under section 1(1) of the Protection of Animals (Amendment) Act 1954 is limited to determining the duration of a disqualification and the kinds of animal to which it relates. It does not permit the court to create the type of conditional exception contained in the original order. That interpretation governs the meaning of the provision at all material times.

3. Section 142(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 gives magistrates a discretion to vary or rescind a sentence or order where it appears to be in the interests of justice. The express extension of the power to replacing an order that is invalid does not make replacement automatic.

4. In exercising that discretion, the magistrates were entitled to consider the invalidity of the original order, the public and animal-protection purposes of the legislation, and the likely position had the case been adjourned pending clarification of the law. The prosecution’s failure to identify the pending appeal was unfortunate but did not amount to an abuse.

5. The Administrative Court could interfere with the replacement order only if the discretion had been exercised unreasonably or perversely, or without consideration of relevant matters. The severity of the 15-year disqualification, viewed as a moderation of the original lifetime order, did not meet that threshold. Any complaint that the sentence was manifestly excessive lay principally by appeal to the Crown Court.

6. Costs were ordered to be paid out of central funds and taxed in due course.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal by way of case stated dismissed. The magistrates’ replacement disqualification order was upheld.