West London Waste Authority, R (on the application of) v The Mayor of London

A statutory strategy must be read as a whole. Individual policies or proposals cannot be treated as absolute requirements where the strategy is aspirational, requires practical judgment, and recognises competing considerations.

A direction under section 356 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 is lawful only where it is necessary to implement the strategy as so understood. The power is not unfettered. A direction cannot exclude an option which might accord with the strategy, including where that exclusion could leave landfill as the only practical alternative.

The claimant waste disposal authority sought judicial review of directions issued by the Mayor under section 356 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999. The directions required the authority’s proposed waste-treatment procurement to include pre-treatment, state-of-the-art emissions equipment and combined heat and power, and previously prohibited guaranteed minimum tonnage.

The authority argued that these unconditional requirements isolated proposal 96 from the Mayor’s municipal waste management strategy, disregarded the best practicable environmental option and could prevent consideration of alternatives to landfill. The central issue was whether the directions were necessary for implementation of the strategy when the strategy was read as a whole.

1. Claim allowed. Paragraph 3 of the direction dated 19 December 2006 and the whole direction dated 19 January 2007 were quashed.
2. The Mayor’s municipal waste management strategy had to be considered in its entirety. It contained aspirational and sometimes competing elements, including practicability, the waste hierarchy, proximity, regional self-sufficiency and the best practicable environmental option. Its policies and proposals were not absolute requirements capable of being applied in isolation.
3. Section 356 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 conferred a discretionary but limited power. The Mayor could issue a general or specific direction only where he considered it necessary for implementing the strategy read as a whole. The power did not permit him to exclude an option which might accord with that strategy. Whether a direction was lawful depended on its practical effect in the context of the whole strategy.
4. The unconditional requirements concerning state-of-the-art equipment and combined heat and power were aspirational and insufficiently attentive to practicability, cost and the circumstances of individual facilities. They could exclude options which might represent the best practicable environmental option and might leave continued landfill as the practical result.
5. The pre-treatment requirement had the same legal defect. Even if pre-treatment was desirable, the direction left no room for another solution which might in fact be the best practicable environmental option. The abandoned guaranteed-minimum-tonnage requirement was likewise unlawful because it failed to account for practicability.
6. The power under section 356 was narrower than the unfettered power considered in R v The Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions ex parte West Sussex County Council CO/4543/97, which concerned section 35(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. The judge refused permission to appeal, directed expedition of any renewed application, ordered a temporary stay pending that application, and awarded costs to the claimant.