Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rideh

A non-derogating control order is unlawful if its cumulative effect deprives the controlled person of liberty contrary to Article 5 of the Convention. The court must assess the restrictions cumulatively, having regard to their duration, objective and practical effect. The Secretary of State must establish the continuing necessity of each obligation on contemporary evidence. Judicial review permits intense scrutiny of individual obligations, while recognising the executive’s institutional competence in national security matters. Proportionality requires consideration of less intrusive alternatives and reasons explaining the balance struck, including the impact of restrictions on mental health. A control order remains lawful only where the statutory conditions and Convention requirements are satisfied.

The Home Secretary made and renewed a control order against Mahmoud Abu Rideh under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. The order imposed residence requirements, a 12-hour curfew, monitoring obligations, restrictions on visitors and meetings, communications restrictions, and financial controls. Mr Rideh had previously been detained under the Anti-Terrorist Crime and Security Act 2001.

The proceedings combined the statutory supervisory hearing concerning the 2005 order with an appeal against its renewal in 2006. His wife, J, was joined as an interested party. The issues included legal certainty, Article 3, Article 5, proportionality under Articles 8 and 10, consultation concerning prosecution, procedural fairness, and the necessity of the individual obligations. The court considered the closely analogous decision in Secretary of State for the Home Department v E, [2007] EWHC 233 (Admin).

1. Article 5. The cumulative effect of the restrictions deprived Mr Rideh of his liberty. The relevant distinction was between deprivation of liberty and mere restriction on freedom of movement. Duration was relevant but not decisive; the objective and practical effect of the regime were more important. The restrictions on residence, movement, visitors, meetings, communications and police entry had to be considered together. The substitution of night-time telephone calls for an electronic tag did not alter the conclusion. The order was therefore one which the Secretary of State had no power to make.
2. National security and necessity. The court accepted that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting involvement in terrorism-related activity and that the national security case was substantial. In assessing continuing necessity, the relevant matters included potential harm, the person’s capacity and willingness to re-engage, and whether the risk could be addressed adequately without a control order. The Secretary of State was better placed to assess national security measures, but the court could conduct intense scrutiny of individual obligations.
3. Proportionality and mental health. The Secretary of State had to show that interference with Convention rights was no more than necessary. This required consideration of less intrusive alternatives and reasons identifying the factors weighed. Although Mr Rideh’s mental health had been considered generally, the decision-maker had not explained how the medical recommendation that he should be able to leave the family home to manage domestic stress had been addressed. The court nevertheless did not determine that the individual obligations were flawed, because the Article 5 conclusion was decisive and the evidential basis for assessing particular relaxations was incomplete.
4. Other issues. The Article 3 threshold was not met. There was no breach of the statutory consultation duty concerning prosecution. The court made observations about the need for continuing review of prosecution prospects, exculpatory material, special-advocate procedure and the continuing necessity of individual obligations.
5. Order. The control order was quashed under section 3(12)(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005.

The judgment describes related procedural history but is a first-instance decision.

• SIAC: Mr Rideh had previously been detained and his certification under the 2001 Act had been reviewed by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The court determined the statutory supervisory proceedings and appeal concerning the control order and quashed the order under section 3(12)(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005.