Crown Prosecution Service v P

A youth court has an inherent jurisdiction to stay criminal proceedings as an abuse of process where a fair trial cannot take place, but a stay before evidence is heard should be exceptional. Capacity must ordinarily be assessed by the court on all the evidence, not solely on medical reports, with the issue kept under continuing review. If effective participation becomes impossible, the court may halt the criminal trial and, where a useful purpose remains, determine whether the child committed the alleged acts under the statutory protective procedure. A previous finding that the child was unfit to plead does not determine capacity in later proceedings. The court also expressed an obiter view that Crime and Disorder Act 1998, section 34 may have abolished only the presumption of doli incapax, not the defence itself.

The Crown Prosecution Service appealed by case stated from the Bishop Auckland Youth Court, where District Judge Wood stayed proceedings against a child as an abuse of process. The allegations concerned assault and taking a vehicle without consent. The defendant had significant intellectual and behavioural difficulties, and uncontested medical evidence indicated that he was unfit to plead and unable to participate effectively in a trial.

The appeal concerned the proper interaction between abuse of process, effective participation, fitness to plead, doli incapax, and the statutory procedure for determining whether a defendant had done the alleged acts before considering a protective order.

1. Appeal allowed. The stay remained in place, but the matter was not remitted because care proceedings had since begun and the relevant events were a year old.
2. A youth court possesses an inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings where continuation would directly affect the fairness of the particular defendant’s trial: [1994] 1 AC 42. However, a stay based on capacity before evidence is heard should be confined to exceptional cases. The court should normally assess the medical evidence alongside the other evidence, including the alleged conduct, the defendant’s reactions and interview, and the defendant’s responses during proceedings.
3. The court, rather than medical experts, must decide whether the child understands the proceedings and can participate effectively. The issue must remain under continuing review. The court may disagree with the medical evidence and may allow the trial to proceed with suitable assistance and procedural adjustments: [2005] EWHC 2583; [2004] 40 EHRR 10.
4. If the criminal trial is halted, the court may exercise its discretion to switch to a fact-finding process under sections 37(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983 and 11 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. That process is not a criminal trial. The defendant’s inability to participate does not make it unfair because the process does not engage Article 6 rights: [2002] EWCA Crim 2988. A stay before fact-finding is appropriate only where no useful purpose could be served.
5. A previous finding that a child was unfit to plead does not make later proceedings an abuse. Capacity is a question of fact to be decided afresh. The earlier decision and unchanged medical evidence may be relevant, but the earlier decision is not binding.
6. The district judge had failed to consider whether the trial should begin, whether there might be no case to answer, whether doli incapax might provide a defence, and whether the situation should be kept under review. His decision was therefore legally flawed.
7. Smith LJ expressed the obiter view that section 34 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 may have abolished only the rebuttable presumption of doli incapax, leaving the defence available. Gross J expressed no view on that unresolved issue.

• High Court (Administrative Court) — appeal by case stated from the Bishop Auckland Youth Court allowed. The stay was not set aside and the matter was not remitted.