Smithkline Beecham Plc & Ors v Avery & Ors

An interim harassment injunction may restrain unlawful protest while preserving a proportionate opportunity for peaceful demonstration. Where representative defendants act for an undefined class, CPR 19.6(4)(b) requires permission before an order is enforced against an individual who is not a named party. That permission cannot generally be granted in advance against unnamed persons, because the court must consider the individual’s circumstances and hear any representations before enforcement. The requirement applies whether enforcement is civil or criminal under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

Customers of Huntingdon Life Sciences sought continuation of an injunction restraining harassment of their employees by persons represented by SHAC and ALF. The order defined exclusion zones around 18 sites but preserved specified opportunities for demonstrations. The claimants also sought permission in advance to enforce the injunction against unnamed persons pursuant to CPR 19.6(4)(b), partly so that police could arrest persons allegedly committing the statutory offence under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The central issues were whether there was a sufficient threat of harassment, whether the protest provisions were appropriate, and whether advance enforcement permission could lawfully be granted.

1. Continuation of injunction. The recent evidence of graffiti, threatening communications, attacks on employees’ homes and vehicles, and abusive demonstrations established a serious threat of harassment from SHAC and ALF. The claimants had shown a sufficient case for the purposes of Human Rights Act 1998, section 12, as explained in [2005] 1 AC 253.
2. Protest conditions. The use of exclusion zones, demonstration zones, a 10am–4pm demonstration window, demonstrations at intervals of not less than 28 days at each site, and a prohibition on megaphones was justified on the evidence. The court refused to require a site visit, add a procession provision, or alter the marked demonstration areas.
3. Representative enforcement. Under CPR 19.6(4), an order binds persons represented in the claim, but it may be enforced against a non-party only with the court’s permission. That safeguard applies equally where enforcement may proceed by contempt or through the criminal consequences of breach under section 3(6) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Permission must address the individual circumstances and afford an opportunity to make representations. It cannot be granted in advance against unnamed persons.
4. Order. The injunctions were continued in the draft form, but paragraph 19, which purported to grant advance enforcement permission, was deleted. The witness statements of the First Defendant and Natasha Avery were added to Schedule A.