Davies v Child Support Agency

A court or tribunal order must ordinarily be obeyed. A person subject to the order cannot unilaterally decide that it was wrongly made, irrelevant or unnecessary and decline to comply. The proper course is to apply to the court or tribunal for discharge or variation.

That principle does not remove the tribunal’s ultimate discretion whether to compel compliance. It may dispense with compliance where the information sought is irrelevant, it has sufficient material to decide the issue, and no injustice has resulted. A reviewing court will not interfere absent an error of law.

Mr Davies sought permission to appeal after Mrs Justice Black dismissed his judicial review claim and refused permission to appeal. The proceedings concerned two tribunal orders requiring the Secretary of State to disclose documents held by the Child Support Agency concerning the assessment and revision of his child-support liability.

The orders were not complied with. The tribunal later forgave the non-compliance because it considered the documents irrelevant, had sufficient information to determine the maintenance issue, and was satisfied that no injustice had occurred. The central question was whether the Administrative Court had erred in law by declining to require enforcement of the disclosure orders.

Application refused.

1. Mr Davies’s criticism of the Secretary of State’s failure to comply with the disclosure orders was well-founded. Orders must be obeyed by private citizens and state officials alike. Those subject to an order cannot decide for themselves that it was wrongly made or irrelevant and therefore ignore it. The proper procedure is to return to the tribunal or court that made the order and seek its discharge or variation.
2. The failure to comply was treated as a procedural misunderstanding, rather than a contumacious or defiant refusal. Reliance on data-protection requirements did not justify non-compliance, although the Secretary of State apologised and the apologies were accepted.
3. The tribunal nevertheless retained an ultimate discretion whether to compel compliance with its order. It was entitled to dispense with compliance where it had all the information needed to calculate the maintenance liability, the requested material could have no possible relevance, and it was satisfied that no injustice had been caused.
4. There was no error of law in the Administrative Court’s judgment or in the tribunal’s exercise of discretion. Mr Davies therefore had no arguable case warranting permission to appeal. The application was refused and the matter was to be put to rest.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Lord Justice Ward refused the application for permission to appeal.
• Administrative Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Mrs Justice Black dismissed the judicial review claim and refused permission to appeal.