MM (Libya) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

On an appeal alleging perversity in an asylum credibility assessment, the appellate court applies the established principles governing findings of fact and perversity. It does not re-try the evidence or substitute its own assessment. A tribunal may evaluate an applicant’s account against country information, the probabilities arising from the particular facts, and the coherence of the claimed conduct. Failure to mention every passage of objective material is not an error of law where the tribunal’s overall approach is sound and its reasons are cogent. A conclusion is not perverse merely because another view could be taken. The appeal succeeds only where the decision cannot reasonably be sustained on proper analysis.

The appellant, a Libyan national and former military officer, claimed asylum in the United Kingdom. He relied on alleged anti-government activities in Libya, the arrest of associates, and a risk of military prosecution, torture or death on return. An immigration judge rejected his evidence and dismissed his asylum and related claims. The appellant alleged perversity, contending that the judge had relied on speculation, adopted subjective or Anglo-centric assumptions, failed to consider country information, and required corroboration.

Permission to appeal was granted only on perversity. The Court of Appeal considered whether the immigration judge’s assessment of credibility and objective material disclosed an error of law or a decision that was unsustainable.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal found no error of law and no perversity in the immigration judge’s determination.
2. The court declined to restate the established principles governing credibility findings and perversity. Those principles were sufficiently clear from HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037, Y v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1223, E v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 49 and R (Iran) v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982. The issue was their application to the decision under appeal.
3. The immigration judge was entitled to assess the claimed leaflet distribution and petition against the country material, including the likelihood of detection and the nature of political activity described in the reports. The absence of express reference to particular passages did not establish an error of law where the reasoning, read as a whole, was sound.
4. The judge was also entitled to consider the appellant’s mother’s uneventful return to Libya as a fact relevant to the probabilities of the appellant’s account. That involved assessment of the specific circumstances, rather than an impermissible general conclusion that no person returning to Libya faced risk.
5. The objective evidence that political groups in the United Kingdom could be infiltrated was not taken into account. That omission was capable of undermining the relevant findings, but, standing with the determination as a whole and the remaining reasoning, it did not make the decision perverse.
6. The judge did not impose an impermissible requirement for corroboration merely by noting the absence of supporting country information for the claimed military jurisdiction. She was also entitled to analyse the documentary and oral evidence in detail.
7. Standing back from the individual criticisms, the determination was objectively reasoned, assessed through the circumstances of Libya rather than Anglo-centric assumptions, and supported by cogent reasons. The formal order was that the appeal be dismissed.

• Asylum and Immigration Tribunal: Immigration Judge Brookfield rejected the appellant’s asylum and related claims in a determination dated 21 March 2007.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal was granted on perversity but refused on bias. The appeal was dismissed.