M & L (Children)

In care and adoption proceedings, once threshold criteria are established, the welfare inquiry may require refusal to return children where supported findings show that an ongoing, violent and volatile parental relationship would expose them to serious danger. A parent’s genuine progress through therapy and parenting or domestic-violence programmes does not require return where the evidence shows that the dangerous relationship continues. Refusal to return may be a proportionate response to protect the children and may make adoption necessary. Where adoption is the only proper and available course, the court may make placement orders dispensing with parental agreement under the Adoption of Children Act 2002, section 21.

The mother sought permission to appeal against care and placement orders concerning her two youngest children, PM and ML, made by Her Honour Judge Andrew in the Principal Registry, Family Division. The judge had found the threshold under section 31(c) of the Children Act 1989 established and concluded that the mother’s continuing relationship with their violent father made their return unsafe. The Court of Appeal considered whether the findings were supported by the evidence and whether the resulting decisions not to return the children and to proceed towards adoption were justified and proportionate.

Application refused. Wall LJ gave the substantive judgment, with Buxton and Pill LJJ agreeing.

1. The judge had ample evidence for her findings, including the father’s violence, volatility and continuing relationship with the mother, and the mother’s continuing contact with him. The threshold under section 31(c) of the Children Act 1989 had been established, and the judge was then conducting the welfare inquiry.
2. At that stage, it was open to the judge to conclude that returning the children to the mother would expose them to potential serious danger. That conclusion remained available despite the mother’s substantial progress in therapy, domestic-violence courses and parenting programmes, because the evidence supported the finding that the dangerous relationship had not ended.
3. The human-rights challenge was rejected. If return would place the children in potential danger, refusing return was a proportionate response. The judge was entitled to conclude that adoption was the only proper and available course and to make placement orders dispensing with parental agreement under section 21 of the Adoption of Children Act 2002.
4. The application did not cross the permission threshold. The Court of Appeal had fuller documentation than Ward LJ when he directed that the application be heard on notice. The evidence did not support an assumption that the father would remain unavailable for a sufficient period to enable the mother to establish a safe situation. Permission to appeal was therefore refused, and no substantive appeal followed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): After a permission application was directed to be heard on notice, the court refused permission to appeal.
• Principal Registry, Family Division: Her Honour Judge Andrew made care and placement orders concerning the two youngest children after finding the statutory threshold established and their return unsafe.