Mayor of London v London Borough of Enfield

A public authority may retain its own statutory decision after another adjudicative body reaches a contrary conclusion in a related context. Its decision to reject that conclusion remains reviewable for irrationality.

The court must consider the nature of the issue, the evidence and procedure underlying the earlier decision, and the tribunal’s statutory role. An initially rational decision may become irrational to maintain where an independent statutory adjudication addressed the same issue, rejected the authority’s reasons, and no new facts or tenable additional reasons justify persistence.

The Mayor directed Enfield under section 356 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 to make appropriate compensatory provision after the closure of a recycling site. A planning inspector and the Secretary of State concluded that existing capacity and improved waste-management arrangements constituted appropriate provision, and planning permission was granted.

The Mayor did not challenge that decision under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. He refused to withdraw his direction. Enfield’s judicial review succeeded on that later refusal in the Administrative Court, where Mitting J held that the original direction had been rational when made but had become irrational to maintain: [2007] EWHC 1795 (Admin). The appeal concerned the judge’s jurisdiction and whether the Mayor’s persistence was irrational.

Lord Justice May gave the judgment of the court. Lord Justice Latham and Lord Justice Moore-Bick agreed.

1. Procedural ground. The refusal to withdraw the direction was expressly included in Enfield’s permitted amended grounds. The judge had jurisdiction to determine it, and the Mayor’s procedural challenge was rejected.
2. Applicable approach. The authorities established no automatic rule that one public authority is legally bound by a related adjudicative finding. A decision-maker may exercise its own judgment, but its rejection of that finding is reviewable on Wednesbury grounds. The court must consider the nature of the finding, its evidential basis, the form of the proceedings, and the tribunal’s statutory role. This approach was derived from Powergen, [1997] 3 PLR 62; [1998] 75 P&CR 89, and Danaei, and was explained in Bradley, [2008] EWCA Civ 36.
3. Application. The planning inspector’s conclusion involved both factual assessment and rejection of the Mayor’s construction of appropriate compensatory provision. It followed a public hearing at which the Mayor advanced the same reasons supporting his direction and those reasons were rejected. The Secretary of State adopted the inspector’s conclusions. The Mayor had not appealed, and section 284 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 prevented the planning decision being questioned outside the statutory routes.
4. The London Plan and Municipal Waste Management Strategy were required to be consistent under section 41 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 and section 38 of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004. The Mayor’s letter identified no fresh facts or tenable additional reasons for reaching a different conclusion. It was therefore unnecessary to separate the planning decision into factual and legal components.
5. The original direction was rational when made, but its underlying justification became untenable after independent statutory adjudicative scrutiny. The Mayor’s refusal to withdraw it was irrational. Appeal dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the Mayor’s appeal and upheld the order requiring withdrawal of the direction.
• Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court: Mitting J held that the original direction was rational when made but that the refusal to withdraw it had become irrational: [2007] EWHC 1795 (Admin).