KM (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

On an appeal from an asylum determination, credibility findings are findings of fact and may be challenged only for an error of law. The specialist tribunal is responsible for evaluating objective material drawn from different sources. An appellant cannot establish legal error by isolating snippets of a large evidential bundle where the material supported the tribunal’s conclusions. The tribunal must account for the limited purpose and safeguards of a screening interview when assessing recorded answers. A finding that was not material to the ultimate conclusion will not justify appellate intervention, even if the finding was harsh. The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a Sudanese national, claimed asylum, humanitarian protection and related Human Rights Act relief. She relied on alleged persecution in Darfur arising from her Falata ethnicity and her husband’s involvement with the Sudan Liberation Army.

On full reconsideration, the Asylum & Immigration Tribunal rejected her account, finding that she was not a Falata from Darfur, had not been the wife of an SLA activist, and had not supported the SLA. She appealed on the basis that the Tribunal had mishandled a screening questionnaire and had reached perverse or unsupported conclusions from the objective evidence. The central issue was whether those matters disclosed an error of law.

Appeal dismissed. Lord Justice Tuckey gave the leading judgment. Lord Justice Rix and Lord Justice Jacob agreed.

1. Challenges to credibility findings in asylum cases are difficult because such findings are findings of fact. The Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction was confined to errors of law and did not permit a general re-evaluation of the evidence.

2. The immigration judge was entitled to treat the answer in the screening questionnaire as a significant mistake concerning the political group with which the appellant’s husband was associated. In assessing such an answer, the judge had to be aware of the limited purpose of a screening interview and the absence of an opportunity to correct or sign the record. The Court considered that an experienced immigration judge would have taken those matters into account. The judge was also entitled to reject the appellant’s explanation.

3. It was the function of the specialist Tribunal to evaluate objective material from its different sources. An appellate challenge could not succeed by selecting isolated sentences or passages from a substantial evidential bundle. The material provided a proper basis for the conclusions concerning the timing and consequences of attacks in Darfur, the alleged raids, the appellant’s claimed journey through roadblocks, and her alleged detention and release.

4. The distinction between the SLA and the SPLA ceasefire did not undermine the Tribunal’s broader conclusion that the appellant had not been in the village at the material time. The finding concerning the roadblocks was not crucial because the Tribunal expressly stated that its credibility assessment did not turn on how she left Sudan. The finding concerning the length of the pregnancy might have been harsh, but nothing turned on it.

5. The remaining ground was not pursued. The Tribunal’s determination disclosed no error of law, and the appeal was dismissed.

1. Asylum & Immigration Tribunal: on full reconsideration, dismissed the appellant’s appeal against refusal of asylum, humanitarian protection and related Human Rights Act relief.
2. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal. Lord Justice Rix and Lord Justice Jacob agreed with Lord Justice Tuckey.