F (A Child)

An application for leave to seek revocation of a placement order does not engage the statutory prohibition against placement pending a substantive revocation application. The distinction is deliberate, and the court cannot use the Human Rights Act 1998 to add words which contradict the clear legislative choice.

This scheme is compatible with the rights of access to a court and respect for family life. Before a substantive application is issued, the parent may seek an injunction preventing placement. An adoption agency should respond openly to a proposed challenge, disclose imminent placement plans and permit judicial consideration. A calculated placement designed to defeat the court process may be susceptible to judicial review.

A father appealed from Judge Coates in Brighton County Court. The judge had held that she lacked jurisdiction to entertain his application for leave to seek revocation of a placement order because the local authority had placed his child for adoption on the day before the hearing.

The authority had proceeded with the placement despite knowing of the issued application and failing to answer the father's urgent request for information. The central questions were whether section 24(5) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 protected an applicant at the leave stage and, if not, whether Convention rights required an extended construction or a declaration of incompatibility.

1. By a majority, the appeal was dismissed. Wall LJ, with whom Wilson LJ agreed, held that section 24(5) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 applies only after a substantive application to revoke a placement order has been made. An application for leave to make that application is legally distinct. Parliament's language was clear and could not be expanded through section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

2. The construction was compatible with articles 6 and 8 of the Convention. A parent had a full opportunity to participate before the placement order and could seek leave to revoke it before placement. Making an automatic prohibition arise only after leave had been granted was a permissible regulation of access to court. It protected children against disruption by unmeritorious or tactical applications while preserving judicial protection for applications with a real prospect of success.

3. Before issue of a substantive revocation application, a parent or proposed applicant may seek an injunction restraining placement. The county court has jurisdiction under section 38 of the County Courts Act 1984, and the High Court has corresponding jurisdiction under section 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. An adoption agency's refusal to disclose its placement programme may itself justify temporary relief.

4. The authority's deliberate failure to answer the father's solicitor and its placement immediately before the hearing amounted to disgraceful sharp practice and an abuse of power. Good practice required a prompt response and disclosure of the imminent placement. The authority should have observed a short moratorium or applied for leave to place, so that the court could decide the issue. Similar conduct may lead to judicial review, an injunction and costs.

5. Thorpe LJ dissented. He considered that section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 permitted an extended construction protecting the parent from the filing of the leave application. He would have allowed the appeal and remitted that application to Judge Coates.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): By a majority, dismissed the father's appeal and upheld the conclusion that placement had removed the county court's jurisdiction to entertain his application for leave.
2. Brighton County Court: Judge Coates reluctantly held that section 24(2)(b) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 prevented the father from pursuing his application after the child had been placed for adoption. She granted permission to appeal.