TG (Central African Republic) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Permission to appeal should be granted where the proposed grounds are arguable and have a real, rather than fanciful, prospect of success. In an immigration appeal involving alleged queue-jumping, evidence that an applicant may be unable to afford the conventional route to entry clearance can raise an arguable challenge to proportionality. A tribunal should engage with material evidence about the applicant’s financial circumstances, earning capacity and the practical cost of obtaining entry clearance. Previous clandestine travel at little or no cost does not necessarily show that conventional travel is financially achievable.

The appellant sought permission to appeal against a decision of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, which had concluded that removal to the Central African Republic would be proportionate. The application was renewed after permission had been refused on the papers by Tuckey LJ.

The proposed appeal challenged the tribunal’s treatment of evidence concerning the appellant’s impoverished circumstances, earning capacity and the cost and practical requirements of obtaining entry clearance. The central issue was whether the case could properly be treated as a Mahmood queue-jumping case where there was no reasonable likelihood that the appellant could join, progress through and complete the conventional entry-clearance route.

1. Permission granted. The court held that the principal criticisms of the tribunal’s decision were arguable and had a real, rather than fanciful, prospect of success.
2. The proposed ground concerned material evidence about the appellant’s impoverished circumstances, wherever he was living, and his earning capacity in the Central African Republic compared with the cost of travel. The tribunal had not expressly rejected that evidence. Its finding that the appellant would take some time to become able to travel was considered too vague to dispose of the issue.
3. The practical route to entry clearance was material. There was no British Embassy or High Commission in the Central African Republic, so the appellant would need to travel to Cameroon to apply and then travel by air to the United Kingdom if entry clearance were granted. The court considered it arguable that these conventional costs were beyond his means.
4. The tribunal’s reliance on the appellant’s previous journey to the United Kingdom did not necessarily answer the point. That journey had been made clandestinely, by land and boat, at little or no cost to him, whereas an entry-clearance application required conventional travel.
5. The other grounds appeared less cogent but were not excluded from the grant. The substantive appeal was directed to be heard by a court of three, including at least one Lord Justice from the Asylum group.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On a renewed application, permission to appeal was granted against the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal’s decision.
• Asylum and Immigration Tribunal: The tribunal had found that removal to the Central African Republic would be proportionate.
• On the papers: Tuckey LJ had refused permission, leading to the renewed application.