TA (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

On an application for permission to appeal from an asylum determination, the Court of Appeal may intervene only where the proposed challenge discloses an arguable error of law. Complaints that a tribunal misunderstood, exaggerated or rejected evidence ordinarily raise factual issues and do not meet that threshold. A tribunal may assess credibility by considering knowledge reasonably expected of a person claiming a particular ethnic or political identity, consistency between interview and cross-examination, and whether the account is sensible in its context. The Court of Appeal will not interfere merely because the evidence could have been assessed differently. Permission should be refused where the findings are sustainable and no perversity or other arguable error of law is shown.

TA (Sudan v Secretary of State for the Home Department concerned a Sudanese national who claimed asylum after arriving clandestinely in the United Kingdom. He claimed to be Beja, an activist in the Beja Congress, and to have suffered ill-treatment including cigarette burns.

The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal rejected his credibility and dismissed his appeal in a determination issued on 25 January 2008 (AIT No. AA/10630/2006). The renewed application for permission to appeal challenged the Tribunal’s treatment of evidence concerning Beja customary law, Beja languages, education and political activity. The central issue was whether those criticisms disclosed an arguable error of law rather than merely disagreement with factual findings.

Application refused. Lord Justice Stanley Burnton held that the proposed grounds disclosed no arguable error of law.

1. The Court of Appeal could intervene only on the basis of an arguable error of law. A challenge directed merely to the tribunal’s assessment of evidence was a factual challenge and did not justify permission to appeal.
2. The Tribunal was entitled to expect a person claiming to be Beja to know something about, and understand questions concerning, Beja customary law. The possibility of an interpretative misunderstanding, in circumstances where a well-qualified Sudanese Arabic interpreter had been used, did not convert the issue into an error of law.
3. The Tribunal was also entitled to rely on inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the applicant’s evidence about the two Beja languages, particularly the contradiction between his interview evidence and his evidence in cross-examination. That was a factual assessment.
4. The challenges concerning Beja education and the evidence discussed in paragraphs 47 and 48 of the Tribunal’s determination were likewise factual. The Tribunal was entitled to assess whether the alleged conduct was sensible for members of an organisation facing governmental attack and to reject evidence it considered incredible. The findings were not perverse or unsustainable.
5. Considering the matters cumulatively, there was no arguable legal basis for an appeal. The Tribunal had also rejected the asserted risk of persecution on return arising from Beja activism. Permission to appeal was therefore refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — Renewed application for permission to appeal refused.
• Asylum and Immigration Tribunal — Determination issued on 25 January 2008, under AIT No. AA/10630/2006; asylum claim rejected and appeal dismissed.