YS (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Permission to appeal should be granted where it is properly arguable that an immigration tribunal treated unproved criminal allegations as serious grounds for considering that an applicant had committed acts excluded from refugee protection under Article 1F. The arguability may arise where the tribunal relies on a foreign indictment despite extradition proceedings failing for lack of supporting evidence, or on domestic charges that resulted in discharge without proof. The Court of Appeal did not finally determine whether those matters satisfied Article 1F.

The appellant, an Egyptian national, claimed asylum in the United Kingdom. The Secretary of State refused asylum under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention, while granting exceptional leave under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal accepted that personal terrorism could constitute conduct contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It relied in part on a United States Grand Jury indictment and on domestic charges concerning the killing of General Masoud, although the extradition proceedings failed for lack of evidence and the domestic charges were discharged. Laws LJ refused permission to appeal. On renewal, the central issue was whether the proposed challenges were properly arguable.

1. Permission granted. The Court of Appeal considered the proposed appeal fairly arguable and granted permission.
2. It was properly arguable that the Tribunal erred in treating the United States Grand Jury indictment as evidence of serious grounds for belief under Article 1F. The extradition proceedings had not proceeded for lack of evidence supporting the allegations, yet the Tribunal relied on speculation about the likely inadmissibility in England of telephone intercept evidence.
3. It was also properly arguable that the Tribunal erred in relying on domestic charges which had resulted in discharge. The charges had been proved to no standard at all, and the Common Sergeant had rejected the inference that the appellant knew the documents he supplied were intended to facilitate the killing of General Masoud.
4. The Tribunal had recognised that the criminal standard of proof differed from the Article 1F standard. Nevertheless, the Court considered it arguable that allegations which had not been established in the domestic proceedings could not, without more, amount to serious grounds for considering involvement in terrorist activity.
5. The Court directed the appellant to concentrate on these matters, which featured sufficiently largely in the Tribunal’s determination to require investigation. No final ruling was made on the merits of the Article 1F issues.

Lord Justice Moses agreed. The order was: application granted.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On renewal of an application after Laws LJ had refused permission in a single sentence, permission to appeal was granted from the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal’s adverse determination dated 20 July 2007.
• Asylum and Immigration Tribunal: The Tribunal determined that personal terrorism, as defined in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, could constitute acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and found serious grounds for considering that the appellant had engaged in such activity.