JB (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

In internal-relocation cases, whether relocation would be unduly harsh is distinct from whether removal would expose a person to an Article 3 risk. Treating the two inquiries as identical is an error of law. The error may nevertheless be immaterial where later country guidance addresses materially the same objective conditions and the claimant identifies no individual circumstances capable of producing a different result. Unchallenged credibility findings and the absence of evidence of a particular and serious individual impact may justify that conclusion. A refusal to adjourn is primarily for the first-instance tribunal. It will amount to an error of law only in very exceptional circumstances, especially where the applicant cannot explain how an adjournment would have assisted.

The appellant claimed refugee status and protection on human-rights grounds, relying on his alleged Darfur origin, Zaghawa ethnicity and persecution. Immigration Judge Gordon dismissed the claims on 8 May 2006. Although the appellant was accepted as a national from Darfur and of Zaghawan ethnicity, his account and age were not believed. On reconsideration, Senior Immigration Judge Baptiste held on 26 March 2007 that there was no material error of law, relying on country guidance concerning internal relocation to Khartoum. The appeal concerned the materiality of the first judge’s conflation of the undue-hardship inquiry with Article 3, and the refusal of an adjournment.

Appeal dismissed; permission application refused.

1. Per Moses LJ, Immigration Judge Gordon had erred by treating the question whether internal relocation to Khartoum would be unduly harsh as equivalent to whether relocation would infringe Article 3. The distinction had been identified through Januzi v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 1188 and reaffirmed in AH. The approach reflected in MH [2006] UKAIT 00033 could not justify that conflation.
2. The error was not material. Senior Immigration Judge Baptiste was entitled to compare the objective evidence before Immigration Judge Gordon with the evidence underpinning the country guidance in HMGO (Relocation to Khartoum) Sudan [2006] UKAIT 00062. The evidence was materially the same. The appellant’s adverse credibility findings could not be challenged, and he had not shown that his age or background conditions would have a particular and serious impact distinguishing his case from those covered by the guidance.
3. The earlier Court of Appeal view in AH that the reasoning in HMGO was infected by the conflation had been displaced by the House of Lords decision in AH, which found that the tribunal in HMGO was not guilty of that error. HMGO therefore remained good law, and there was no realistic basis for success if its guidance applied.
4. Decisions on adjournments are primarily matters for the tribunal hearing the request. A challenge requires very exceptional or striking circumstances demonstrating an error of law. No such circumstances existed, and the appellant had not explained how an adjournment would have assisted.

Longmore LJ agreed. The appeal was dismissed and the application was refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal and refused the permission application.
2. Asylum & Immigration Tribunal, Senior Immigration Judge Baptiste: on 26 March 2007, concluded that Immigration Judge Gordon had made no material error of law.
3. Asylum & Immigration Tribunal, Immigration Judge Gordon: on 8 May 2006, dismissed the appellant’s refugee and human-rights claims.