North Devon Homes Ltd. v Batchelor

Under section 7(4) of the Housing Act 1988, proving a possession ground does not itself require an order: reasonableness remains a fact-sensitive evaluation. An appellate court should not substitute its view unless the first-instance conclusion was plainly wrong. The court must assess the seriousness and circumstances of the established conduct, reliable evidence of likely recurrence, and the case actually proved. Unsubstantiated nuisance allegations and peripheral or ambiguous warnings cannot enlarge the case. An appellate court should not make a disputed factual finding omitted below; remittal is unnecessary where the possible finding could not affect the result. On the facts, the respondent’s convictions and tenancy breach did not make possession reasonable.

North Devon Homes Ltd., a registered social landlord, sought possession of premises let to Nova Batchelor under an assured tenancy. The claim relied on Grounds 10, 12 and 14 of Part II of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1988.

The county court found Grounds 12 and 14 established in relation to the respondent’s convictions and breach of the tenancy, but held that it was not reasonable to make a possession order. The Ground 10 claim concerning rent arrears was adjourned and was not challenged on appeal. The appeal alleged that the judge had taken an irrelevant matter into account and had failed to consider prior warnings and the possibility of continuing cannabis use. The central issue was whether the evaluative decision was plainly wrong or required remittal.

1. Appeal dismissed. The order dismissing the possession claim under Grounds 12 and 14 was upheld. The rent-arrears issue under Ground 10 was outside the appeal.
2. Section 7(4) of the Housing Act 1988 makes proof of a possession ground subject to the further question whether it is reasonable to make an order. That question involved an evaluation of the facts and evidence. The Court of Appeal should not interfere unless the conclusion below was plainly wrong. Arden LJ supported this approach by reference to Cresswell v Hodson [1951] 2 KB 92.
3. The judge was entitled to treat the respondent’s cannabis conviction as insufficiently serious, on the particular facts, to warrant possession. He was not speculating impermissibly about rehousing. His observation concerned the seriousness of the conduct. The prior warning letter principally addressed visitors and alleged drug dealing. Those allegations had not been proved. Even if the letter could be read as warning against cannabis use, that warning was peripheral and did not undermine the essential conclusion.
4. The appellate court could not itself make the disputed finding that the respondent would continue to use cannabis. If that finding could have affected the result, remittal would have been necessary. The evidence included later statements that she had stopped using cannabis, however, and even a finding based on the earlier equivocal evidence would not have altered the judge’s evaluation. Remittal was therefore unnecessary.
5. Arden LJ emphasised that the accepted basis of the cocaine plea provided no basis for treating the respondent as a supplier or user, and that the judge had, by implication, accepted that she did not intend to possess cannabis in future. The unproved nuisance allegations had to be left out of account. Wall LJ observed, obiter, that possession proceedings are serious and must be determined by close attention to the particular facts. The breaches did not fall within the scope of Bristol City Council v Martin Musah (1997) 20 HLR 32. The court did not consider it necessary to re-examine the authorities relied on below, including Stonebridge Housing Trust v Gabbidon [2002] EWHC 2091 (Ch).

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal from the county court order dismissed.
2. Torquay and Newton Abbot County Court: On 13 February 2008, His Honour Judge Neligan dismissed the possession claim under Grounds 12 and 14, and adjourned the Ground 10 rent-arrears claim.