North Wales Police v Anglesey Justices

Proceedings under section 2 of the Dogs Act 1871 are civil proceedings and must be initiated by a complaint. An initiating document is construed by its substance, rather than by an unsuitable heading or later procedural terminology. The use of statutory forms is not mandatory where the relevant rules adopt an untechnical approach. A subsequent summons describing the matter as an information does not deprive the court of jurisdiction where the initiating document properly invokes the statutory jurisdiction. Defects concerning the form of procuring appearance are cured by appearance. Judicial review may be brought by a party with standing where the issue concerns the initiating complaint, rather than a later criminal prosecution for non-compliance with an order.

Police proceedings were brought after a dog allegedly bit a police constable. The document used to start proceedings was a pro forma headed “North Wales Police Summons Heading Form”, but its body stated that a complaint was laid and sought an order under section 2 of the Dogs Act 1871.

Anglesey Justices held that the document was an information and that the proceedings were a nullity. On judicial review, the Administrative Court held that it was a complaint. The Chief Constable sought permission to appeal, challenging that conclusion and raising related arguments about form, standing, disclosure and the subsequent summons.

1. Permission refused. The proposed appeal had no real prospect of success. The Administrative Court was plainly right that the initiating document was a complaint under section 2 of the Dogs Act 1871.
2. The proceedings under the first part of section 2 were civil proceedings. They had to be commenced by complaint, not information. Proceedings commenced by information would be a nullity, as illustrated by R v Nottingham Justices, ex parte Brown [1960] 1 WLR 1315. That authority did not assist the proposed appeal because the document in the present case was, in substance, a complaint.
3. The document’s heading and its unsuitable pro forma did not alter its legal character. Its body expressly stated that a complaint was laid and that an order was sought under section 2. The court staff were therefore entitled to receive it as a complaint. Rule 2.1 of the Magistrates’ Courts (Forms) Rules 1981 showed that statutory forms were not mandatory and supported an untechnical approach.
4. Jurisdiction derived from the initiating document. The later summons’ references to an information and an informant did not affect jurisdiction. Defects in the form of procuring a party’s appearance were cured by appearance: R v Hughes (1879) 4 QBD 614, 633.
5. The standing objection failed. The statutory assignment to the Director of Public Prosecutions concerned the later criminal prosecution of a person who failed to comply with an initial order, not the initiating complaint. The disclosure arguments were immaterial because the only issue was whether the document was a complaint or an information. The application for permission to appeal was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal from the Administrative Court’s judgment of 5 February 2008 was refused. The court upheld the conclusion that the initiating document was a complaint.
• Administrative Court: Judicial review was granted in respect of the Anglesey Justices’ decision of 25 January 2007.
• Anglesey Justices: The proceedings were treated as a nullity because the initiating document was considered to be an information.