B (A Child)

Whether to order a parental assessment between fact-finding and disposal is a fact-dependent exercise of judicial discretion. An assessment is not required merely because it might provide material about rehabilitation or future care. Following findings of grave injury, the court may refuse an assessment where it would serve no useful forensic purpose, create false hope, or waste time and public funds. A guardian may oppose an unrealistic assessment application in accordance with the paramount consideration of the child’s welfare. The guardian has no unlimited responsibility to pursue rehabilitation or to support every application for assessment.

The mother and father each applied for permission to appeal the refusal of their applications for assessment after a fact-finding hearing concerning serious injuries sustained by the child, J. The mother sought assessment before the disposal hearing; the father made a similar application shortly afterwards. The county court judge had found both parents wholly unreliable, had regarded the mother as the more likely perpetrator, and could not exclude the father’s responsibility or collusion.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the judge had erred in refusing the assessments, particularly in light of Re L and H [2007] 1 FLR 1370, and whether the guardian was entitled to oppose the mother’s application.

1. Applications refused. The county court judge had exercised a discretion in a case involving extremely grave injuries to a child. The Court of Appeal held that she was entitled to refuse both assessments.
2. The question whether an assessment is likely to assist the judge at the disposal or final hearing is fact-dependent. Re L and H [2007] 1 FLR 1370 supported the general proposition that an assessment may be ordered where it is likely to assist the judge at trial. It also recognised that an assessment under section 38(6) which would serve no purpose could be a waste of time and public funds. The present case fell within the latter category on the judge’s findings.
3. The absence of delay was not decisive. The judge was entitled to conclude that the assessments would be inappropriate, would hold out false hope, and would not provide a useful basis for the disposal decision. Interference would have wrongly implied that a judge could not refuse an assessment after findings of grave injury.
4. The guardian was entitled to form a view about the realism of the application and to oppose it in accordance with the paramount consideration of the child’s welfare. The proposed wider duties to pursue rehabilitation and support assessment applications were unsustainable.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On an appeal from Warrington County Court, permission applications by the mother and father were refused. The court upheld the judge’s refusal of the requested assessments.