Lockwood, R. v

[2008] EWCA Crim 1099

Case details

Case citations
[2008] EWCA Crim 1099
Court
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
Judgment date
1 May 2008
Judgment text

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Subjects
Criminal Sentencing Dangerous offenders
Keywords
imprisonment for public protection dangerousness section 229(3) grievous bodily harm with intent broken bottle attack minimum term guilty plea credit violent previous convictions
Outcome
appeal allowed in part (minimum term reduced to 2½ years; indeterminate sentence upheld)
Judicial consideration

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Summary

For the statutory presumption of dangerousness under section 229(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a sentencing judge may properly rely on the extreme violence of the index offence and relevant previous specified violent offences. Repeated unprovoked alcohol-related violence may justify an indeterminate sentence for public protection.

When fixing the minimum term, the court must give proper credit for a guilty plea and assess the gravity of the attack and the offender’s record. A notional determinate sentence must remain proportionate even in a case involving grave violence with a broken bottle and kicks to the head.

Factual background

The appellant pleaded guilty at Leeds Crown Court to causing grievous bodily harm with intent after an unprovoked, alcohol-related attack. He struck the complainant on the head with a bottle, including when it was broken, and kicked him in the head after he fell.

The Crown Court imposed imprisonment for public protection, specifying a minimum term of three years less 106 days on remand. The appellant renewed his application for permission to challenge the indeterminate sentence and appealed the specified minimum term. The issues were whether he was dangerous within section 229(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and whether the minimum term was excessive.

Held

  1. The court declined to permit a challenge to the sentence of imprisonment for public protection. It agreed with the single judge that the statutory presumption of dangerousness under section 229(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 applied. The appellant had previous specified offences of violence, and the index offence was one of extreme violence.

  2. The sentencing judge was entitled not to disapply the presumption. The index offence and the earlier specified offences were all violent incidents associated with alcohol. They involved unprovoked attacks on members of the public. Those matters entitled the judge to find the appellant dangerous within the statutory meaning.

  3. The appeal against the specified minimum term was allowed. A notional determinate sentence of six years following a guilty plea, equivalent to nine years after trial, was excessive. The court accepted that the offence was exceptionally serious: the appellant struck the complainant’s head with a broken bottle and then kicked him in the head. His previous record was also aggravating.

  4. Taking those features into account, the court assessed the appropriate sentence after trial at about seven years. Allowing appropriate credit for the guilty plea, it assessed the determinate equivalent at five years. The minimum term was therefore substituted with one of two and a half years, less 106 days spent on remand.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  • Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal against the specified minimum term and substituted a term of two and a half years less time on remand. It declined to permit an appeal against the sentence of imprisonment for public protection.
  • Leeds Crown Court: Following a guilty plea to causing grievous bodily harm with intent, imposed imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of three years less 106 days on remand.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
appeal allowed in part (minimum term reduced to 2½ years; indeterminate sentence upheld)

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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