Duffy & Ors, R. v

For murder, the sentencing judge must start with the applicable statutory minimum-term starting point, but must impose a term that properly reflects punishment and deterrence. In a planned public killing arising from gang warfare, the need to protect the public and deter comparable conduct can justify very long minimum terms, including for young offenders.

A manslaughter sentence should bear a sensible relationship to co-offenders’ murder sentences, but there is no arithmetical formula. It remains dependent on the offender’s proved role and all the circumstances. A central organiser of an ambush involving a firearm may properly receive a substantial determinate sentence despite lacking an intention or foresight of death or serious injury.

Four defendants applied for leave to appeal against sentences imposed after a lengthy trial concerning the planned shooting of Liam Smith outside Altcourse Prison. Lloyd, who arranged the attack from prison, and Forshaw and F were convicted of murder. Duffy was convicted of manslaughter after the jury found that, although he played an organising role and knew a firearm might be used, it was not proved that he intended or foresaw death or serious injury.

The trial judge imposed life sentences with minimum terms of 28, 20 and 18 years respectively on the murder defendants, and a determinate sentence of 20 years on Duffy. The applications challenged the length of those terms, particularly in light of youth, limited participation, and Duffy’s manslaughter conviction.

1. All four applications for leave to appeal against sentence were refused. The trial judge was entitled to treat the planned daylight shooting as an exceptionally grave episode of gang warfare. The public need for deterrence was especially acute because such violence could create a false aura of glamour among young people and undermine security in affected communities.

2. For the murder defendants, the judge was required under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to impose life sentences and fix minimum terms. The statutory starting point was a necessary starting point, not a mechanical result. The judge had properly allowed for Lloyd’s age despite the substantial increase in starting point on reaching 18, while giving decisive weight to his instigation of the execution. The 20- and 18-year minimum terms imposed on Forshaw and F also properly reflected the use of a firearm, their participation in the planned attack, and the need for deterrence despite their youth.

3. Duffy’s 20-year sentence for manslaughter was not excessive. A manslaughter sentence should have a sensible relationship to the statutory periods now prescribed for murder, but no standard formula or arithmetical comparison governs. Duffy was not a peripheral participant: he had a central organising role in assembling an ambush involving a firearm. The court treated R v Tomney [1986] 8 Cr.App.R(S) 161 as illustrating the need to adjust sentencing to changed public conditions, and considered R v Kent [2004] 2 Cr.App.R(S) 367 consistent with the sentence after allowing for the absence there of gang warfare and organisation.

4. It was also proper to take account of the fact that Lloyd’s life sentence would subsume an earlier sentence of imprisonment for public protection.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Refused all four applications for leave to appeal against sentence.
• Trial court: Following trial, Saunders J imposed life sentences with minimum terms on the three defendants convicted of murder and a determinate sentence on Duffy for manslaughter. No citation for the trial decision was stated.