Copsey & Anor, R v

A trial judge may ask questions to clarify evidence, but must not appear to disbelieve an accused or assume the role of a second cross-examiner for the prosecution. The fairness inquiry requires the court to assess the nature, frequency and cumulative effect of the interventions, together with any treatment of important defence evidence in the summing-up.

Where hostile questioning and disparaging comments give the jury the clear impression that the judge rejects a central defence case, a general direction that fact-finding is for the jury may not cure the unfairness. The resulting conviction is unsafe and must be quashed.

Graham Copsey had given an undertaking under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 not to be concerned in company management without the court's leave. At Winchester Crown Court, he was convicted of managing Visaplus Relocation Ltd while disqualified and of involvement with a prohibited company name. His wife, Natalia Copsey, was convicted of aiding and abetting the management offence.

The prosecution relied substantially on documents, correspondence and conversations said to show that Mr Copsey managed the company. The defence maintained that Mrs Copsey alone managed it. The appeals challenged the trial judge's interventions during the appellants' evidence and his treatment of defence evidence in the summing-up. The central issue was whether the appellants had received a fair trial.

1. All appeals were allowed and the convictions were quashed. There was no allegation of actual bias. The question was whether the judge's questioning and interventions meant that the appellants did not receive a fair trial and that the convictions were unsafe.

2. A judge was entitled to ask appropriate questions to clarify matters. However, the judge's repeated questions of Mr Copsey were cross-examinatory in character. The use of repeated challenges ending with “did you?”, the hostile manner of the exchanges, and the suggestion that an important feature of the defence was “bizarre” would have conveyed to the jury that the judge did not believe Mr Copsey. The judge thereby assumed a role more appropriate to prosecuting counsel.

3. The judge's later direction that questions of fact were for the jury, and that they should disregard any apparent judicial view, did not remove the effect of those interventions. The court also regarded the cursory and dismissive treatment in the summing-up of Angela Adams's evidence as significant. Her evidence supported the defence account of Mr Copsey's limited role. That matter alone would not have justified allowing the appeal, but it reinforced the cumulative conclusion of unfairness.

4. Accordingly, Mr Copsey's conviction on the management count was unsafe. The Crown properly accepted that this required Mrs Copsey's conviction for aiding and abetting to be quashed, and that Mr Copsey's conviction on the prohibited-name count must also be quashed. The court did not address the remaining grounds. The Crown stated that it would not seek a retrial, and defendants' costs were ordered from central funds.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed both appellants' appeals and quashed all convictions. The Full Court had granted leave on two grounds and referred the remaining applications to this court.
• Crown Court at Winchester: On 21 May 2007, convicted Graham Copsey of the management and prohibited-name offences, and Natalia Copsey of aiding and abetting the management offence.